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THE Texas Legislature has recently made extensive changes in the Texas
Workmen's Compensation Act,' but few of -the changes have been re-
flected in reported appellate opinions during the survey year. There were,
however, several cases construing for the first time the statutory amendments
of 1971, as well as some startling innovations in what was thought to be es-
tablished law.
The most significant developments have been in the area of occupational
diseases. These cases are of particular importance because of the substantial
statutory changes which they interpret. Accordingly, these decisions will be
analyzed in detail in conjunction with the applicable statutory amendments.
I. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Occupational Disease. The Sixty-Second Legislature repealed the occupa-
tional disease list 2 and in its place substituted a broad definition of "occupa-
tional disease." A comparison of section 20 prior to this amendment3 with
the amended section 204 reveals that the first sentence dealing with "injury"
and "personal injury" remains unchanged. Occupational disease, however,
was transformed from a specific list of physically induced diseases into a defi-
nition which includes diseases arising out of the employment situation, as well
as diseases which are induced by repetitious physical traumatic activity.
The Houston (Fourteenth District) court of civil appeals considered this
new occupational disease statute in Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. v.
Hollis.5 The claimant, an employee of twenty years, was continually ex-
posed to the inhalation of paint, dust, and poisonous chemicals. On the day
* B.B.A., LL.B., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas.
1. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306, 8307, 8309 (Supp. 1973). These changes
are discussed in Collins, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28
Sw. L.J. 131 (1974).
2. Ch. 113, § 2-9, [1947] Tex. Laws 176-79 (repealed 1971).
3. See id. The section contained an exclusive list of diseases which would qualify
as occupational diseases within the meaning of the workmen's compensation statute.
4. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added):
[Occupational diseases] shall be construed to mean any disease arising out
of and in the course of employment which cause damage or harm to the
physical structure of the body and such other diseases or infections as na-
turally result therefrom. An 'occupational disease' shall also include dam-
age or harm to the physical structure of the body occurring as the result of
repetitious physical traumatic activities extending over a period of time
and arising in the course of employment; 'provided, that the date of the
cumulative injury shall be the date disability was caused thereby. Ordi-
nary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the
employment shall not be compensable, except where such diseases follow
as an incident to an 'occupational disease' or 'injury' as defined in this Sec-
tion.
5. 511 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th District] 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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in question he was exposed to a particularly heavy inhalation of various ma-
terials and became violently ill. The claimant alleged that the toxic sub-
stances inhaled on this occasion and those he was exposed to over his long
term of employment had had the cumulative effect of injuring him and ren-
dering him disabled. 6 In concluding that these were proper allegations of
a compensable injury under amended section 20,7 the court commented:
"[I]t is no longer necessary to allege and prove either an event traceable
to a definite -time, place and cause or a listed compensable occupational
disease."8 While the latter is clearly correct under the amended statute, the
former has never been a requirement of an occupational disease. The court's
comment concerning section 20, however, is dictum because the carrier's con-
tention on appeal was only that the evidence was legally and factually insuffi-
cient to support the finding of injury occurring on the day in question.9 The
above quoted language is nevertheless disturbing if interpreted to mean that
no distinction is to be made under the amended statute between an accidental
injury and an occupational disease.
No evidence exists to indicate a legislative intent to abolish the distinc-
tion between "accidental injury" and "occupational disease."'10 The courts
of this state have long recognized this obvious distinction. In Solomon v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co.," for example, the San Antonio
court of civil appeals stated: "An industrial accident or accidental injury
is distinguished from an occupational disease by the following characteristics:
An industrial accident can always be traced to a definite time, place and cause,
whereas industrial disease is of slow and gradual development and the time,
place and cause thereof is not susceptible of definite ascertainment."' 2  In
line with this reasoning, other courts have held that for there to be an acci-
dental injury or industrial accident, there must be an undesigned, unforeseen,
untoward, or unexpected occurrence or mishap traceable to a definite time,
place, and cause.' 8
Occupational disease, on the other hand, has long been recognized to be
one which is acquired in the usual and ordinary course of employment, and
which is recognized to be incidental thereto as well as being slow and gradual
in development,' 4 the untraceable nature of the disease being the indispen-
6. Id. at 584.
7. See note 4 supra.
8. 511 S.W.2d at 584.
9. Id. at 585.
10. At this writing, only three reported cases have considered amended § 20. Char-
ter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 511 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (dictum only); Haley v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 487 S.W.2d
369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Legate v. Bituminous Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 483 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Haley and Legate both held that the amendment was not applicable because the case
under consideration arose prior to the effective date of the amendment.
11. 347 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd).
12. Id. at 19.
13. See, e.g., Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.
1972); Consolidated Underwriters v. Wright, 408 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. McKay, 146 Tex. 569, 210 S.W.2d 147(1,948); Solomon v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 347 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.
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sable element. If the disease was traceable to a specific event, it became
an accidental injury.1" A compensable occupational disease was governed
by the provisions of section 2516 and, to some extent, section 27.17 Silicosis
and asbestosis were controlled by section 26.18
Under the pre-1971 statutes, all occupational diseases, including poisoning,
blister, and silicosis, were physically induced and were not associated with
mentally induced incapacity, while disabilities associated with mental or psy-
chological causes were compensable only as accidental injuries, i.e., traceable
to a specific time, place, and cause.19 Important to an interpretation of
amended section 20 is the fact that the pre-1971 statutes prescribed that an
accidental injury was compensable even if the employee was suffering from
a pre-existing disease or condition that rendered him more susceptible to in-
jury, or aggravated, accelerated, or prolonged the effect of the accidental in-
jury.20 Thus, an accidental injury was not required to be the sole producing
cause of the incapacity but only a producing cause "which, either independ-
ently or together with one or more injuries or conditions, results in inca-
pacity, and without such incapacity would not have occurred when it did.''21
An occupational disease, however, is again distinguishable from an accidental
injury because section 22,22 which was not repealed in 1971, provides that
-- San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Cowan, 271 S.W.2d
350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rudd v. Gulf Cas. Co., 257
S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1953, no writ); American Sur. Co. v. Ritchie,
182 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
15. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 146 Tex. 89, 203 S.W.2d 775
(1947); Consolidated Underwriters v. Wright, 408 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Robinson, 241 S.W.2d 339
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wade,
197 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
16. Ch. 113, § 7, [1947] Tex. Laws 178. This Section provided, in part, that there
was to be no recovery for an occupational disease "unless such disease shall be due to
the nature of an employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist and
are characteristics thereof and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment,
and is actually incurred in such employment ...."
17. Ch. 113, § 9, [1947] Tex. Laws 179. This section limited compensation to the
"acute" stage of the disease if the disease could be arrested by change of employment
or medical treatment.
18. Ch. 113, § 8, [1947] Tex. Laws 178.
19. See, e.g., Hood v. Texas Indem. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 417 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); cf. Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972).
20. See, e.g., Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1973);
Maston v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 160 Tex. 439, 331 S.W.2d 907 (1960); Gill v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 417 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ); Moun-
tain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Redd, 397 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21. 2 TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 22.01 (1970) and cases cited therein.
22. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 22 (1967). The section provides:
Where an occupational disease is aggravated by any other non-compensa-
ble disease or infirmity, or where incapacity or death from any other non-
compensable cause, is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated or in anywise
contributed to by an occupational disease, the number of weeks of com-
pensation payable by the association shall be reduced and limited to such
proportion only of the total number of weeks of compensation that
would be payable if the occupational disease were the sole cause of the in-
capacity or death, as such occupational disease, as a causative factor, bears
to all the causes of such incapacity or death, such reduction in compensa-
tion to be effected by reducing the number of weekly payments of compen-
sation for which the Association is liable.
1975]
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the occupational disease must be the sole cause of the disability in order to
make a full recovery. If the occupational disease is aggravated by any non-
compensable condition or if a noncompensable condition is aggravated by the
occupational disease, recovery is reduced. This distinction was clearly
pointed out in 1954 in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Etheredge,
23
wherein Mr. Justice Garwood, writing for the Texas Supreme Court, stated:
This section [22] appears to make a deliberate and radical difference
between the law applicable to occupational disease and that concerning
industrial accident, where the erstwhile compensable event or disability
may be affected by a noncompensable factor. There is no comparable
provision in the law concerning industrial accident. 24
Analyzing amended section 2025 in view of the operational guidelines es-
tablished under pre-1971 law, it is apparent that the legislature has retained
the distinction between accidental injury and occupational disease, but also
broadened the scope of occupational diseases compensable under the Act.
The very wording of the amended statute clearly distinguishes between indus-
trial accidents and occupational diseases, as did the former statute, since two
separate and distinct definitions are contained in section 20. Most signifi-
cant, however, is the fact that section 2226 has not been repealed or altered
in any way. 2 7 This fact clearly indicates legislative intent to retain what Mr.
Justice Garwood labeled "a deliberate and radical difference" 28 between acci-
dental injury and occupational disease.
Additional support for the continued distinction between accidental in-
juries and occupational diseases in the amended statute is found in the second
part of the occupational disease definition contained in section 20. The stat-
ute provides that occupational disease "shall also include damage or harm
to the physical structure of the body occurring as the result of repetitious
physical traumatic activities extending over a period of time."'29 Since the
phrase "shall also include" was used rather than "may also include," it is sub-
mitted that the amendment must be construed as a whole and not as con-
taining separate and divisible parts.3 0  When so construed, the phrase "ex-
tending over a period of time" obviously relates to the well established case
law holding that occupational diseases are not traceable to a definite time,
place, and cause. Thus, under the amended statute, if an occupational
disease is traceable to a definite time, place, and cause, it should be treated
as an accidental injury.
The distinction between accidental injury and occupational disease is of
significance under the amended statute because of the contention advanced
by at least one commentator that mentally induced occupational diseases,
23. 154 Tex. 1, 272 S.W.2d 869 (1954).
24. Id. at 876.
25. See note 4 supra.
26. See note 22 supra.
27. Sections 25, 26, and 27, however, were all repealed. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 8306 (Supp. 1974).
28. 154 Tex. at 12, 272 S.W.2d at 876.
29. See note 4 supra.




e.g., high blood pressure as a result of job tension, heart attack as a result
of job pressures and frustrations, are compensable under amended section
20. 1  Obviously, the legislature intended to broaden the occupational
disease category to include the previously listed diseases as well as numerous
others associated with various occupations. The legislature also included dis-
ability resulting from jobs requiring repetitive physical work. While these
are legitimate diseases which should be compensated, it is erroneous to con-
clude that the statute now compensates for allegedly mentally induced
diseases. Under prior case law, only physically induced occupational dis-
eases were compensable.3 2  This distinction has been introduced into the
amended section 20 since the legislature used the term "physical" as related
to traumatic activities. Construing the amendment as a whole, and giving
effect to each word as required by statutory construction, leaves little doubt
that if the legislature had intended mental stimuli to constitute causes of oc-
cupational diseases, it could have easily added that word or even deleted the
word "physical."
This construction of the statute remains valid even in light of the supreme
court's 1955 holding in Bailey v. American General Insurance Co.,3 3 wherein
the court interpreted the phrase "physical structure of the body" to mean the
entire breathing, living, and functioning person and not simply the skeletal
structure. In Bailey the court allowed recovery for mentally induced mental
disability if traceable to a definite time, place, and cause. This holding, how-
ever, does not decry either the fact that prior case law has interpreted oc-
cupational disease to be of gradual development, or, more importantly, the
fact that the legislature specifically used the term "physical" in defining occu-
pational disease. It is not contended that mental stimuli causing mental dis-
ability as in Bailey is not compensable under amended section 20 because,
if traceable to a definite time, place, and cause, any mental disability is com-
pensable as an accidental injury. However, occupational disease is of slow
development and the amended statute is designed to avoid the tenuous proof
problems associated with untraceable stimuli such as anxiety, tension, pres-
sure, and overwork which allegedly cause diseases. The exclusion of these
types of diseases appears to be in conformity with the other portions of sec-
tion 2034 which require occupational disease to arise "out of and in the course
of employment" and which exclude "ordinary diseases of life to which the
general public is exposed outside of the employment."3 5
31. Terry, Occupational Disease and Cumulative Injury, 8 TRIAL LAW F., April-June
1974, at 3.
32. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
33. 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
34. See note 4 supra.
35. For example, heart attacks are not known to be caused by one simple stressful
event, or even several stressful events. The event is simply the triggering mechanism.
The real underlying cause is often atherosclerosis, a hardening of the arteries thought to
begin in early life. Due to the fact that there can be several concurring causes to heart
disease and heart attacks, a series of frustrating on-the-job events should not be held
to have created a disease arising out of and in the course of employment to which the
general public is not exposed.
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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
One observer 36 has analogized the Texas occupational disease amendment
to the California compensation statute from which the Texas statute is said
to originate. California apparently allows compensation for mentally in-
duced disease 37 and thus it is concluded by this writer that the Texas statute
would allow recovery for almost any and all allegedly mentally induced dis-
eases. The important distinction, however, is that the California statute spe-
cifically defines injury to include repetitive mentally traumatic activities ex-
tending over a period of time38 while the Texas statute has conspicuously
omitted the word "mental." If psychic occupational diseases are made com-
pensable in Texas, the workmen's compensation statute will literally place
upon industry the burden of providing cradle to grave health insurance for
employees.3 9
Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Murphy40 was another case concern-
ing the distinction between an accidental injury and an occupational disease.
There the claimant inhaled zinc and lead fumes resulting from welding gal-
vanized iron on three consecutive days. He became ill on the first day and
continued to be ill until the end of the third day when he sought medical
treatment. In answer to special issues, 41 the jury found the claimant sus-
tained an injury on or about each of the three mentioned days in the course
and scope of his employment and that such injury was the result of an acci-
dent resulting in permanent, partial disability. 42 Although not noted by the
court in its opinion, the evidence also demonstrated that the claimant suf-
fered, and had suffered for a number of years, from chronic bronchitis and
shortness of breath due to heavy cigarette smoking, acute arthritis of the right
ankle mortis associated with osteomyelitis, cirrhosis of the liver and ulcer dis-
ease directly related to an overindulgence of alcohol, and had recently under-
gone a prostate operation. 43 The Houston (First District) court of civil ap-
peals held that Murphy had indeed suffered a three-day accidental injury
occurring on -the above-mentioned three days. The Murphy holding seems
contrary to the supreme court's holding in Olson v. Hartford Accident & In-
demnity Co.,44 which rejected a similar contention. In Olson the employee
contended that his heart attack was caused by several frustrating job related
experiences occurring over a period of nineteen days. The majority of the
court rejected -the contention that this constituted an accidental injury.45 Jus-
tice Greenhill, writing for the majority, stated:
36. Terry, supra note 31, at 4.
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id.
39. Cf. Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972);
Houston Fire & Cas. Co. v. Biber, 146 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940,
writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
40. 506 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. Id. at 314.
42. Id.
43. Record at ,137-67, 207, Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Murphy, 506 S.W.2d 312
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972).
45. For there to be an accidental injury, or industrial accident, there must be
an undesigned, untoward event traceable to a definite time, place and
cause. . . . This Court, in Middletown v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108
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The plaintiff did not perform manual labor as that term is usually un-
derstood. Previous to his heart attack, he was not subject to any par-
ticular physical strain or over-exertion. He was the subject of three or
four irritating or frustrating experiences on the job over a period of nine-
teen (19) days. These occurrences caused him to be nervous, dis-
turbed, exasperated, and annoyed. These manifestations may be char-
acterized as mental stimuli. But no attempt was made to connect any
one of them to the heart attack which the plaintiff had.46
Thus, as in Olson, Murphy failed to connect any specific event on any spe-
cific day at any specific place as having occasioned the claimed accident.
While it has long been recognized that an occupational disease may also be
the subject of a claim for accidental injury, 47 such claim must nonetheless
fulfill the requirements of accidental injury as enumerated in Olson. That
is, it must emanate from an undesigned, untoward event traceable to a
definite time, place, and cause. 48
Due to the pre-existing maladies of the claimant in Murphy, it was tac-
tically more advantageous for him to proceed on the single accidental injury
theory than on an occupational disease theory which would have made avail-
able to the defendant the defenses of sections 22 and 12c of article 8306. 49
Section 22 would have entitled the carrier to submit to the jury percentage
contribution questions concerning all of the maladies which may have con-
tributed to the claimant's disability. Without the benefit of that section,
however, the carrier was reduced to a sole cause defense only. Had the em-
ployee proceeded on three individual accidents, the Second Injury Fund es-
tablished by section 12c would have confined his recovery to the aggravation
caused by the single specific exposure alleged. Accordingly, the court's ap-
proval of the submission deprived the carrier of defenses which the legisla-
ture had accorded it.5O
Although the Murphy case was governed by the pre-1971 occupational dis-
ease statutes, this opinion and -the opinion of the Houston (Fourteenth Dis-
trict) court of civil appeals in Hollis may well portend the repudiation of the
distinction between occupational diseases and accidental injuries under the
1971 amendments. If the legislature intended to change the meaning of oc-
cupational disease, however, the question arises as to the necessity of speci-
Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 (1916), and dealing with the purpose of the Work-
men's Compensation Act, said '. . . the character of injuries, or wrongs,
dealt with by the Act becomes important. Notwithstanding the breadth of
some of its terms, its evident purpose was to confine its operation to only
accidental injuries, and its scope is to be so limited.' 185 S.W. at 560.
477 S.W.2d at 859-60.
46. 477 S.W.2d at 859 (emphasis added).
47. See cases cited note 15 supra.
48. See note 45 supra.
49. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 22 (1967); ch. 349, § 1, [1947] Tex.
Laws 690.
50. The submission of issues under § 22, which was not repealed by the 1971
amendments, would have been substantially similar to those in 2 TEXAS PATrERN JURY
CHARGES §§ 28.14, 28.15 (1970). Subsequent to the trial of this case, however, the su-
preme court amended TEx. R. Civ. P. 277 and abolished submissions of inferential re-
buttal issues. See notes 279-95 infra and accompanying text.
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fically including "repetitious physical traumatic activities extending over a
period of time" to be an "occupational disease." In the past, the courts have
consistently rejected repetitious physical traumatic activities as constituting a
single accident. If the legislature has retained the previous construction of
accidental injury, and it seems clear that it has, and added repetitious physi-
cal traumatic activity as a specifically included occupational disease, then sec-
tion 22 is clearly applicable and would authorize a reduction of compensation
pursuant to its terms. If this is a correct interpretation, then the Murphy
opinion can neither be harmonized nor rationalized with prior holdings of the
Texas courts and ithe legislative intent in passing -the 1971 amendment. If
three days is, according to Murphy, a sufficiently definite time, place, and
cause to account for a single accidental injury, then whether incidents occurr-
ing over seven-day, eight-day, fifteen-day, or even one-hundred-and-eighty-
day periods can be construed as being a single accidental injury is open to
inquiry.
Occupational Disease-Last Injurious Exposure. In Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Luker,5' an asbestosis case, the Houston (Fourteenth District) court
of civil appeals interpreted the statutory phrase "last injuriously exposed" as
found in section 2452 which had not been amended and which had previously
been considered in only two other cases. 53 Section 24 requires an employee
to prove that he was "last injuriously exposed" to the hazards of the occupa-
tional disease while in the employ of the employer whose carrier he seeks
to hold liable.
In Luker the claimant worked as an insulator for twenty years while be-
longing to his local union. He worked for numerous employers on various
jobs ranging from one-half day to several months duration. His asbestosis
claim was made against Keene Insulation Contracting Division, his employer
for approximately nineteen days. The asbestos workers' union went on strike
and Luker submitted to a lung biopsy that confirmed a previously suspected
asbestosis diagnosis. Prior to his employment with Keene, the claimant was
examined by a medical doctor because of complaints associated with the dis-
ease of asbestosis. At that time, the doctor suspected asbestosis and advised
Luker to undergo a lung biopsy for definitive diagnosis. Luker refused the
biopsy because he wanted to delay surgery until his union was on strike. He
refused another suggested biopsy prior to the strike, when he was re-ex-
amined by the same doctor. After the biopsy confirmed the diagnosis, the
claimant filed a claim for occupational disease against his last employer,
51. 511 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
52. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 24 (1967): "Where compensation is
payable for an occupational disease, the employer in whose employ the employee was
last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease shall be deemed the employer
within the meaning of the Act."
53. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Etheredge, 154 Tex. 1, 272 S.W.2d 869 (1954);




Keene, alleging he was "last injuriously exposed" to the hazards of asbestosis
during his employment and, therefore, pursuant to the provisions of section
24, Keene was to be deemed the employer responsible for the payment of
compensation. Although the claim arose under the pre-1971 occupational
disease statute, the carrier did not contest the requirements of the statute and,
in fact, admitted that exposure occurred during the employment with Keene.
The carrier vigorously denied, however, that Luker's nineteen-day exposure
was harmful or injurious.
The Texas Supreme Court had previously considered the proof necessary
to prove injurious exposure under section 24, the question raised in Luker,
in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Etheredge,54 which was the first case
to interpret the provisions of section 24. Justice Garwood writing for the
court concluded that injurious exposure "may be established by evidence of
the kind produced here, that is, lay evidence of substantial amounts of silica
dust plus medical opinion connecting it with actual injury." 55
Etheredge's definitive analysis of section 24 appeared to determine the
proof requirements of "injurious exposure." 56  In 1971, however, the Beau-
mont court of civil appeals, by inference, began an erosion of the Etheredge
proof requirement of lay testimony connected with medical testimony of ac-
tual harm in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jennusa,5 7 a death claim by
the widow of a thirty-five-year asbestos worker. The deceased was employed
by the insured seven months. A doctor testified the deceased died after an
operation for carcinoma of the lungs caused by asbestosis. Two fellow em-
ployees described the work done by the deceased and testified that the in-
sulating material used gave off asbestos dust which was breathed by all em-
ployees including the deceased. The opinion by the Beaumont court is lack-
ing in pertinent facts, and it is not clear whether the carrier even contended
that there was no evidence of injurious exposure, i.e., expert testimony link-
ing exposure to actual injury. The carrier apparently did contend that no
claim was established because there was no expert or opinion evidence that
the deceased actually breathed asbestos dust. This contention, however, was
54. 154 Tex. 1, 272 S.W.2d 869 (1954).
55. Id. at 10, 272 S.W.2d at 874. The court specifically rejected the carrier's posi-
tion that the claimant must prove injurious exposure by producing scientific evidence of
the amount of silica dust inhaled. The carrier based this contention on the accepted
medical fact that exposure to less than 5 million particles of silica per cubic foot of air
is not harmful. The court concluded, however, that the 5 million particle theory was
not applicable to Etheredge since his expert witness stated that he was actually harmed
by the exposure regardless of the number of particles.
56. Justice Garwood cogently noted that scientific progress could easily change the
requirments:
With the legitimate reservation that our decision may well not entail a like
result in later cases with different evidence and that our conclusions about
the finality of particular scientific 'facts' (so often mere contemporary ma-jority opinion!) will necessarily vary with scientific progress, we conclude
that the opinion of Dr. Kahn [plaintiff's medical expert] was, with the
other proof [plaintiff's testimony of exposure to silica dust], some evi-
dence to sustain the questioned finding of injurious exposure at Trojan
Foundries.
Id. at 10, 272 S.W.2d at 874.
57. 469 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, no writ).
1975]
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summarily overruled, apparently on the authority of Etheredge.5s While not
expressly denying the expert testimony requirement of Etheredge, Jennusa
certainly caused concern for its livelihood. Finally, in Luker, the erosion of
the "medical testimony of actual harm" requirement of Etheredge was com-
pleted.
In Luker the Houston (Fourteenth District) court of civil appeals, conced-
ing the absolute absence of direct medical testimony connecting the nineteen-
day exposure to actual injury, relied upon two inferences allegedly drawn
from the medical testimony in order to find actual harm. For its first infer-
ence, ,the court looked -to testimony allegedly from the employee's expert wit-
ness to the effect that the lungs have an adverse reaction to each particle
of asbestos inhaled. From this testimony the court inferred: "It ...
seem[s] :to follow that each additional exposure to high concentrations of
dust would have a cumulative effect and would be injurious."5 9 The second
inference of actual injury came from the expert's testimony wherein he stated
that, had he been sure of the asbestosis diagnosis during the first examination
of the employee, he would have advised the employee to terminate his work
as an insulator. From this testimony, the court inferred that "further ex-
posure would be damaging."60  In drawing these two inferences, the court
ignored the direct and uncontroverted admissions of the employee and his
expert witness that the employee's complaints, symptoms, physical findings,
and x-rays never changed before or after his nineteen-day employment. 61
Moreover, the court ignored the fact that the expert never testified that the
lungs react adversely to each particle of asbestos inhaled and never testified
to actual injury.6 2 The court further ignored the fact that the employee
never testified that he was exposed to high concentrations of dust. 63 The
court held that the two inferences satisfied Etheredge's requirement of medi-
cal -testimony connecting the exposure to actual injury. The startling disparity
between the medical testimony in Etheredge, wherein the expert testified to
actual harm, and Luker, wherein the doctor never testified -to actual injury
or harm, creates the distinct impression that the Etheredge definition of in-
58. The court wrote: "We have studied carefully Justice Garwood's opinion in
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Etheredge. . . and are of the opinion that the contention
so advanced by the insurer is not in accord with either the letter or the spirit of § 24
of the Act." Id. at 427.
59. 511 S.W.2d at 590 (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. In response to questions on cross-examination, the claimant testified that in the
period from January 1971 to July 1971 there was no change in his symptoms or com-
plaints. The claimant's expert medical witness was asked: "From January 1971, to July
of 1971, there was absolutely no change in his condition? Answer: As far as I could
determine, that's correct. Question: And as far as he knew and reported to you? An-
swer: Correct." Record at 91-92, 234-35, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Luker, 511 S.W.2d
587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
62. Personal review of Record. In fact, the most that could be gleaned from the
doctor's testimony is that inhalation of asbestos over a long period of time causes a con-
tinuous reaction of lung tissue even when the person is subsequently removed from con-
tact with asbestos. Moreover, the doctor agreed that generally a person must be exposed
to a concentration of approximately 5 million asbestos particles per cubic foot of air




jurious exposure was no more than an ephemeral judicial mirage.64
Occupational Disease-Notice of Injury and Filing of 'Claim. In Employers
Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Schmidt,65 the Eastland court of civil
appeals construed the portion of the amended occupational disease statute
dealing with repetitious physical traumatic activities which provides "that the
date of the cumulative injury shall be the date disability was caused there-
by."66 Plaintiff was awarded damages for total and permanent disability as
a result of chronic myositis or trapezius syndrome resulting from the position
in which she was required to work in her employment as an assembler of
small watch components. The carrier contended that, as a matter of law,
the date of plaintiff's "cumulative injury" was September 7, 1971, and, there-
fore, she failed to file her notice of injury and claim for compensation with
the Industrial Accident Board within six months of the date disability began.
It was admitted that the claim for compensation was filed with the Board
on June 27, 1974. The issues submitted by the trial court, quoted in the
opinion,67 reveal that the jury was not required to find the date of the cumu-
lative injury, but only required to find whether plaintiff filed her claim within
six months of -the date of cumulative injury.68 The only date referable to
disability and cumulative injury was the jury's finding -that plaintiff suffered
from total disability which began on February 20, 1972.69
It may be argued that the inclusion of the "cumulative injury" provision
of section 20 provides a third date from which to calculate the time for giving
notice of injury and filing a claim for compensation as required by section
4a. 70 This section requires notice of injury to be given within thirty days and
a claim for compensation filed within six months after the occurrence of an
injury or the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease. Section
20, however, does not appear, at first glance, to speak in terms of a classic
injury, i.e., traceable to a definite time, place, and cause, and certainly does
not speak in terms of the "first distinct manifestation" of an occupational dis-
ease. A literal reading of these two sections may create the impression that
a third standard has been legislated which measures the timeliness of notice
of injury and filing of claim for compensation. Within the context of the
whole Compensation Act, however, these sections should be harmonized,
with the result that the only two standards by which to measure timeliness
are "date of injury" and "date of first distinct manifestation of an occupa-
64. As of this writing, there has been no particular medical or scientific advance-
ment in the field of diagnosing or treating asbestosis, as prognosticated by Justice Gar-
wood, which would lead one to the conclusion that the Etheredge requirements should
be renovated to comport with modern day scientific thought.
65. 509 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974), writ ref'd n.r.e., per curiam,
516 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1974).
66. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Supp. 1,974); see note 4 supra.
67. 509 S.W.2d at 400-01.
68. Special Issue 12: "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
within six months from the date of cumulative injury (or disease), plaintiff had a rea-
sonable doubt as to whether her condition arose out of the course of her employment
with U.S. Time Corporation?" 509 S.W.2d at 401.
69. Id. at 400.
70. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967).
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tional disease."' 71 The harmony results from the legislature's use of the word
"injury" in section 20. This is also the term used in section 4a. 72 Had the
legislature intended to provide an additional date from which to measure
thirty-day notice and six-months filing, it obviously could have deleted the
term "injury" and provided that the date of the cumulative "effects" of the
repetitious physical traumatic activity would be the date from which to mea-
sure timeliness. Such drafting would have avoided invoking the historical
qualifications associated with the term "injury." As drafted, however, it is
submitted that the claimant under a repetitious physical traumatic activity
case must demonstrate a specific time, date, and place of disability rather
than relying upon an ethereal accumulation of non-specific events and subjec-
tive complaints.
This interpretation appeared to be applied to section 20 by the Eastland
court of civil appeals in Schmidt, albeit by inference only. In interpreting
section 20, however, it is submitted that the Schmidt case is incorrect when
it relies upon the jury's finding of total disability as the date that "disability
was caused" by the repetitious physical traumatic activity. Had the legisla-
ture intended the date of "total disability" to be the date of disability, it
would have so written. Only the word "disability" is used, not the words
"total disability." "Disability" can begin long before "total disability" or
even "partial disability" begins. The carrier in Schmidt should have re-
quested an issue requiring the jury to find the date disability began. Perhaps
a definition of "disability" should be submitted which defines the word as
any disability resulting from the alleged physical traumatic activity regardless
of whether the claimant continues to work.
Two other cases also dealt with good cause contentions related to occupa-
tional disease claims. In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Rowan78 and Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Luker74 contentions were made that the claimant
did not file his claim for compensation within six months of the first distinct
manifestation of the disease of asbestosis. Amazingly, prior to these two
cases, only one other Texas case had ever been concerned with the interpre-
tation of the phrase "first distinct manifestation." In Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Miller75 the El Paso court of civil appeals was confronted by an occupational
disease caused by poisoning from petroleum products resulting in chronic
71. Id.
72. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967) reads, in pertinent part, as
follows (emphasis added):
Unless the association or subscriber have notice of the injury, no proceed-
ing for compensation for injury ... shall be maintained unless a notice of
injury shall have been given within thirty (30) days after the happening of
an injury or the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease and
unless a claim for compensation . . . shall have been made within six (6)
months after the occurrence of the injury or of the first distinct manifes-
tation of an occupational disease.
Id. art. 8306, § 20 (Supp. 1974), reads, in pertinent part, as follows (emphasis added):
"Provided, that the date of the cumulative injury shall be the date disability was caused
thereby."
73. 499 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. 511 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
75. 390 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1965, no writ).
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bronchitis. On appeal, the carrier contended that notice was not given within
thirty days of the first distinct manifestation of the disease. The court sus-
tained the carrier's factual insufficiency attack on the jury's notice finding,
holding that "first distinct manifestation" meant that the claimant knew, or
should have known, that he had an occupational disease and that the mani-
festation was distinct to the claimant and reasonably sufficient to cause him
to believe that he had an occupational disease. 76  The court further held
that there was no need to define "distinct" or "manifest" since the dictionary
defined these words as meaning clear, well defined, and evident to the
senses.
77
The Rowan case did not concern itself with a definition of "first distinct
manifestation" in a direct sense. The Tyler court of civil appeals analyzed
the evidence in terms of a "good cause" case related to a general injury,
never citing Miller. The excuse offered in Rowan was that the claimant did
not know that her dermatitis condition was related to her employment until
so informed by a doctor some three years subsequent to the first manifesta-
tion of her symptoms.78 The conclusion of the court in Miller that the phrase
"first distinct manifestation" simply means the symptoms of a disease are
clear, well defined, and evident to the senses seems correct. It does not re-
quire ,the naming of a disease to a claimant, but logic dictates that after the
symptoms become clear, well defined, and evident to the claimant's senses,
there must be evidence to demonstrate that the symptoms are related to the
claimant's occupation or employment. This seems to be the basic holding
of Rowan although the court appears to have reached the right result for the
wrong reasons.
In Luker the Houston (Fourteenth District) court of civil appeals specific-
ally noted and approved the Miller interpretation of "first distinct manifesta-
tion.179 The court then summarily held that the evidence supported the
jury's finding that the first distinct manifestation of the disease of asbestosis
did not occur until July 1971. The portion of the evidence quoted by the
court to support its holding, however, appears to be intended to support a
holding that the specific occupational disease, in this case asbestosis, must
actually be named to the claimant before he can be charged with knowledge
of the disease. It is submitted, however, that this is not required by the stat-
ute nor by the Miller opinion. This is not to be confused with the claimant's
knowledge that the disease is connected with his employment, especially in
the case of an occupational disease that is peculiar to a particular trade or
occupation such as asbestosis, silicosis, anthrax, glanders, psittacosis, and
other similar diseases. Had the legislature intended to allow an employee
to make a claim only after a medical doctor actually named the precise dis-
ease to the employee or only after a definitive diagnostic procedure, it would
have written such requirement into the statute. That it did not was speci-
fically noted in Miller:
76. Id. at 288.
77. Id.
78. 499 S.W.2d at 340.
79. 511 S.W.2d at 590.
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Some jurisdictions start the time running when disability occurs, others
when diagnosis is made, and such other fixed times; but our legislature
had seen fit to provide a more flexible standard. We see no error in
not defining the formula in the charge, for the word 'distinct' means
clear, well defined; and the word 'manifest' means evident to the senses.
,. . A distinct manifestation of an occupational disease, therefore, de-
notes that its existence is clearly evident. It should be clear to the
claimant before the loss of his right to compensation is denied for fail-
ure by him, or someone in his behalf, to take positive action within the
period of time prescribed. We think that the statute means that the
manifestation must be distinct to the claimant, reasonably sufficient to
cause him to believe that he has an occupational disease.80
Luker appears to place great emphasis on the fact that the claimant's doc-
tor did not tell him he had asbestosis and that the claimant himself allegedly
knew nothing about asbestosis until undergoing a lung biopsy. However, the
Houston (Fourteenth District) court of civil appeals ignored the fact that
the lung biopsy had been previously recommended by the claimant's doctor
and further ignored the undisputed fact, not recited in the court's opinion,
that the same doctor had recommended the same biopsy before the claim-
ant was ever employed by the carrier's insured."' Had the claimant under-
gone the recommended lung biopsy, he would not have made a claim against
the carrier's insured since he was not even employed by that insured when
either biopsy was recommended.8 2 He declined the biopsies, however, be-
cause he preferred to wait until his union was on strike before undergoing
surgery. It seems clear that the legislature did not intend to allow employees
to pick and choose ,the employer against whom they would make claims for
occupational diseases. The provisions of section 4a, in conjunction with the
last injurious exposure provisions of section 24, attempt to furnish objective
guidelines to determine the employer who must ultimately assume the eco-
nomic burden of providing compensation to victims of diseases such as asbes-
tosis. The Luker case is a prime example of the employee being able to
surreptitiously secrete known medical information, never allowing the pros-
pective employer the opportunity to consider the enormous economic risks
of providing a livelihood to such employee. It is submitted that the issue
of "first distinct manifestation" contains the same requirement as a good
cause excuse in an accidental injury case, i.e., the standard of ordinary pru-
dence under all of the facts and circumstances. 83  The issue then becomes,
80. 390 S.W.2d at 288.
81. Record at 52, 57. The court also ignored the undisputed fact that Luker first
developed the classic symptoms of asbestosis and first complained about the symptoms
to a doctor in 1969. Moreover, from August 19,69 until January 1971 Luker was treated
for these continuing complaints by his family doctor. He was ultimately referred to The
Diagnostic Clinic in January 1971 where he was examined and advised to undergo a
lung biopsy which could confirm the preliminary diagnosis of abestosis. This same rec-
ommendation was made during a re-examination in April 1971. More importantly, how-
ever, the court ignored the written judicial admission made by Luker when he filed his
claim for occupational disease with the Industrial Accident Board. On the claim form,
in answer to the question as to when the first distinct manifestation of the occupational
disease occurred, Luker answered January 1971. Record at 140-45.
82. 511 S.W.2d at 589.
83. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hughes, 497 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1973); Texas
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as seems to be contemplated by the wording of the statute, whether or not
a reasonably prudent person, under the same or similar circumstances, would
remain totally unconcerned and inactive concerning his rights or would a rea-
sonably prudent person protect his rights by filing his claim for compensa-
tion.8 4
Second Injury Fund-Prior Injuries. Prior to September 1, 1971, section
12c of article 8306 provided a carrier with the defense of percentage contri-
bution of prior injuries to a present incapacity.8 5 The intention of the legis-
lature in enacting this article was to protect carriers from paying for an em-
ployee's incapacity caused by an on-the-job injury for which compensation
had already been paid, i.e., prevent double recovery for the same inca-
pacity.8 6 The 1971 amendment of section 12c87 destroyed this defense by
providing that "the association shall be liable for all compensation provided
by this Act." Under the amended section 12c, proof of a prior compensable
injury no longer reduces recovery of a workman because of a prior injury.88
Although the statute does not speak specifically in terms of subsequent in-
juries, the legislative intent appears to be to abolish any percentage contribu-
tion defense. Even under the prior language of section 12c, it was question-
able whether subsequent compensable injuries constituted a percentage de-
fense, 9 but in light of the clear language of the amendment, there is little
doubt that neither prior nor subsequent compensable injuries will reduce
compensation. 0
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Portley, 153 Tex. 62, 263 S.W.2d 247 (1953); Copinjon v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 242 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1951, writ ref'd).
84. This was cogently noted by Judge Norvell, in Copinjon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 242 S.W.2d 219, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951, writ ref'd):
Taking as true his statements of pain and suffering undergone by him fol-
lowing the accident of August 5, 1946, Appellant's action in delaying the
filing of his claim until December 27, 1948, does not meet the standard of
ordinary prudence. This conclusively appears as a matter of law. To
hold otherwise would be to effectively nullify the statutory provisions de-
signed to secure the prompt filing of claims and prevent frauds oft times
incident to the filing of stale demands. We cannot indulge the over-cred-
ulous at the risk of admitting the fraudulent, but must follow the public
policy of the state as declared by legislative enactment.
85. Ch. 349, § 1, [1947] Tex. Laws 690.
86. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d
744 (1962).
87. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Supp. 1974) provides (emphasis
added):
[I]f an employee who has suffered a previous injury shall suffer a subse-
quent injury which results in a condition of incapacity to which both in-
juries or their effects have contributed, the Association shall be liable for
all compensation provided by this Act, but said Association shall be reim-
bursed from the 'second injury fund' as hereinafter described, to the extent
that the previous injury contributed to the combined incapacity.
88. 511 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974,. writ ref'd n.r.e.).
89. In Southern Underwriters v. Grimes, 146 S.W.2d 1058 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1941, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.), the statute was held not to apply to a subsequent
injury, although the subsequent injury appeared to be non-compensable. Contra, Jones
v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), where the point was raised directly. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d 744 (1962), the subsequent injury was allowed
as a reduction in the trial court but the question was not raised or passed on by the
supreme court.
90. It should also be noted that the operation of the Second Injury Fund does not
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Wrongful Discharge or Discrimination. The first appellate interpretation of
the 1971 amendment to the Compensation Act providing for protection of
compensation claimants and witnesses, 91 occurred in 1974 in Swanson v.
American Manufacturing Co. 9 2 Although the Fort Worth court of civil ap-
peals found it unnecessary actually to interpret the specific provisions of this
article, the opinion should nevertheless be carefully studied by both employ-
ers and insurers. Swanson, seeking employment with AMCOT, falsified his
employment application by stating he had never made a claim for compensa-
tion. The application specifically provided for dismissal from employment
for any false statements. 93  Subsequent to his employment, Swanson was in-
jured on the job and fired when the false statement was discovered. Suit
was filed against the employer and an adjuster employed by the employer's
compensation carrier pursuant to article 8307c, claiming wrongful discharge
because a compensation claim had been filed as a result of the injury while
working for AMCOT. The Fort Worth court of civil appeals affirmed the
trial court's summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding the evi-
dence established, as a matter of law, that Swanson was fired solely as a re-
sult of his false statements and not because of his compensation claim. In
so holding, the court noted the employee was estopped by the term of the
employment contract from asserting that his dismissal was actionable.9 4
More importantly, however, the court specifically observed that the adoption
of the employee's position would encourage persons seeking employment "to
falsify his application, to deceive and to mislead the prospective employer
in every possible way in order to gain employment. Such a result was never
intended by the legislature when it enacted Art. 8307c, V.A.T.S."95
Course and Scope of Employment-Travel. In a disputed area of compen-
sation law, the ,Dallas court of civil appeals held in Brown v. Forum In-
appear to have been changed by the 1971 amendments. The present language of § 12c
and § 12c-1 is identical to the prior language of these sections except the prior sections
referred specifically to the employee, not the Association. Accordingly, prior 1971 Sec-
ond Injury Fund cases appear to be applicable to an interpretation of the amended lan-
guage. In Second Injury Fund v. Keaton, 162 Tex. 250, 345 S.W.2d 711 (1961), the
supreme court held that § 12c does not create an independent cause of action within
itself, but must be construed in connection with § 12c-1. Section 12c-1 limited the lia-
bility of the Second Injury Fund to situations involving a combination of specific injuries
resulting in total and permanent incapacity. The court specifically noted that combina-
tions of general injuries and injuries resulting only in partial disability were not com-
pensable from the Second Injury Fund.
Under the amended language of § 12c-l, the Association must file its claim against
the Second Injury Fund within 180 days following the date of injury. It must also file
evidence of its payment of all compensation provided for under the Act as well as evi-
dence of the pre-existing permanent physical impairment qualifying the Association for
reimbursement. Good cause under art. 8307, § 4a is applicable to such filing. Obvi-
ously, in all cases other than outright severance of a hand, arm, leg, etc., it will be very
difficult to comply with the 180-day requirement, not only from the standpoint of know-
ing the full effects of the injury within 180 days, but also producing evidence that all
payments due under the Act have been paid.
91. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Supp. 1974).
92. 511 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
93. Id. at 562-63.
94. Id. at 565.
95. Id. One question raised by art. 8307c, apparently not yet litigated, is whether
the standard Texas workmen's compensation and employer's excess liability policy pro-
vides coverage to employers for actions against them under this article.
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surance Co.9 6 that an employee killed while acting in furtherance of his em-
ployer's business, even though in direct violation of the employer's rule re-
garding the manner and method of performing the work, was in the course
and scope of his employment, and his heirs were entitled to recover compen-
sation death benefits. The employee, instructed by his superior to travel to
Chickasha, Oklahoma, on company business, violated a known company rule
by flying his own private aircraft. The court noted the split of authorities
throughout the United States, distinguished the Texas Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Brown,9 7 and relied upon the rule quoted
from Larson's treatise9" to the effect that the choice of a particular type of
vehicle to perform the employer's work is a choice of method, rather than
a deviation from the course and scope of the employment.99
In a radical departure from well established law, the Beaumont court of
civil appeals has held that an employee's "minor deviation" from the course
and scope of his employment is no reason to deny compensation. The em-
ployee in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Keys'00 was employed as a juke box
repairman on call twenty-four hours a day. The employer furnished a
pickup truck for the employee's business and personal use. The employee
was driving the pickup, accompanied by his wife and a friend, when he was
killed in an automobile accident. The employee was to make a service call
at Albert's Inn, but was driving his wife to church at the time of the acci-
dent. The accident occurred several blocks beyond the street leading directly
to Albert's Inn and the employee was traveling away from the Inn. Al-
though the court noted the specific provisions of the statute governing
travel, 1 1 as well as -the numerous supreme court cases interpreting the stat-
ute,10 2 it proceeded to hold that under the "peculiar facts" of the case, the
"unusual nature of the employment," the "demands of the work," a relaxa-
tion of -the hard and fast rule which would deny compensation under these
facts was required because of the "small deviation, both in time and space,"
from the course and scope of employment.' 0 3
The difficulty in applying the Keys approach to any particular factual
setting is that the court must decide what is or is not a "small deviation."
96. 507 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
97. 131 Tex. 404, 409, 115 S.W.2d 394, 397 (1938), wherein the supreme court an-
nounced the applicable rule as follows:
While it seems to be the rule that a violation of instructions of an em-
ployer by an employee will not destroy the right to compensation, if the
instructions relate merely to the manner of doing work, yet it seems to be
held by the weight of authority that violation of instructions which are
intended to limit the scope of employment will prevent a recovery of com-
pensation.
98. IA A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 31.20-.25 (1973).
99. Id. § 31.25, at 6-30.
100. 502 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, §§ 1, lb (1967).
102. E.g., Davis v. Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1971); John-
son v. Pacific Employers Indem. Co., 439 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. 1969); Agricultural Ins.
Co. v. Dryden, 398 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1965); Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d
290 (Tex. 1965); Janak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1964);
Jecker v. Western Alliance Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963); Texas Gen. Indem.
Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963).
103. 502 S.W.2d at 833.
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The teaching of all prior cases is that not only must the employee demon-
strate compliance with section lb, but in addition, he must show that the
injury was of a kind and character that had to do with and originated in the
work, business, trade, or profession of the employer and was received while
he was about the furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer.' 0 4
In Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. McDonald'0 the San Antonio court
of civil appeals reversed the trial court and rendered a judgment against the
widow of a deceased workman, holding that the evidence established, as a
matter of law, that the employee's death did not originate in the employer's
business and was not in the furtherance of the employer's affairs. 10 6 The
supreme court also refused a writ of error in McDonald just as in Keys. The
McDonald case is factually distinguishable from Keys as it involved a travel-
ing salesman who stopped for the night in Kerrville, Texas, on the business
of his employer. After checking into a motel and eating dinner, activities
which are held to be in the course and scope of employment for traveling
salesmen," ° 7 the employee was found dead near the company truck 200 yards
from the place where he had eaten dinner. Under the Keys rationale the
question becomes whether the deviation is "minor" or "major" according to
the "demands of the work" and the "peculiar facts."
'In Reid v. North River Insurance Co.'0 8 the El Paso court of civil appeals
properly invoked section 1 requirements in sustaining a jury verdict in favor
of the carrier in a social drinking case also involving transportation under sec-
tion lb. It seems apparent that Keys conveniently ignored the requirements
of section 1 in attempting to rationalize a radical deviation from prior case
law.
Course and Scope-Coming and Going Rule. In the significant decision of
Texas Compensation Insurance Co. v. Matthews'09 the supreme court refused
to extend the "access" exception to the "going to and from work" rule. The
stipulated facts revealed that the employee was injured on two occasions
while crossing a street on the way from a parking lot to her place of employ-
ment in the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company 'Building in Dallas. The
telephone company, through an independent contractor, was making exten-
sive improvements to -the building. The contractor erected a barricade en-
closing the sidewalk adjacent to one side of the building and extending into
the street. Near the barricade was a crosswalk marked by the city of Dallas
for pedestrian use in crossing the street. Both of plaintiff's injuries occurred
while crossing the street near the barricade and within the confines of the
crosswalk. The claimant contended she was required to use the particular
route she was using at -the time of her injuries because of the construction
104. Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963).
105. 502 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. Id. at 605.
107. See, e.g., Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965); Walker
v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 443 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, writ
ref'd).
108. 508 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ).
109. 519 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1974).
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barrier placed adjacent to the building. As observed by the supreme court,
however, other members of the public using the sidewalk were also required
to cross the street at the same point where the claimant crossed. Moreover,
the claimant's injuries actually occurred within the white cross-walk markers
placed in the street by the city of Dallas for members of the general public
as well as the claimant and her fellow employees. More importantly, how-
ever, the court stressed the fact that the claimant was not required to use
this particular route to reach her place of employment.
-In rendering judgment for the carrier, Chief Justice Greenhill recited the
well settled rule that the benefits of the workmen's compensation statute do
not apply -to injuries received going to and from work. 110  The "access
doctrine" exception to the going to and from work rule was summarized by
the court as follows:
An exception to this rule [going to and from work] is made in cases
which have formed the 'access doctrine,'-cases in which the employer
has evidenced an intention that the particular access route or area be
used by the employee in going to and from work, and where such access
route or area is so closely related to the employer's premises as to be
fairly treated as a part of the premises.' 11
The court agreed with the statement of the dissenting justice in the Dallas
court of civil appeals 112 that the access exception to the going to and from
work rule had been carried as far as reasonable without an amendment to
the Compensation Act in Kelty v. Travelers Insurance Co. 1 3  In Kelty the
same Dallas court of civil appeals held an injury on an icy and slippery side-
walk ten or twelve feet from the entrance to the employer's place of business
possibly to be within the exception, since the employer had exercised domin-
ion over the sidewalk so as to make it, in effect, part of his premises. The
supreme court in Matthews distinguished Kelty by finding that -the employer
had not attempted to exercise any control over the street, or the crosswalk,
and that neither the street nor the crosswalk formed a part of its premises.
The court held that the employee was not within the course and scope of
her employment when she was injured, thereby reversing and rendering judg-
ment for the carrier.
Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Rawl 1 4 concerned an unusual prob-
lem involving both travel and a pseudo going to and from work problem.
The deceased employee, an eight year old minor in a special education first
grade class, was employed by Angelina Poultry Company, along with other
school-age boys, to gather chickens at the company's broiler house. The boys
110. See, e.g., Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965); Texas Gen.
Indem. Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963); Dishman v. Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n, 440 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Viney v.
Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 82 S.W.2d 1088 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935, writ ref'd).
111. 519 S.W.2d at 631, discussing Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112
Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (1922).
112. 519 S.W.2d at 632; see Texas Compensation Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 504 S.W.2d
545, 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), rev'd, 519 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1974).
113. 391 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
114. 500 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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were picked up at their homes late in the evening, driven to the broiler house
where they performed their work, and then returned to their home later the
same night. The deceased employee was picked up on the night in question
by another employee of Angelina, driving an Angelina pickup truck, and was
taken to the broiler house. On returning to his home, the deceased employee
got out of the truck across the highway from his home with another boy.
The driver of the truck admonished the boys not to cross the road until he
told them to go. Without being told, however, the deceased employee
crossed the highway and was struck and killed by a passing vehicle.
On appeal from a jury verdict awarding death benefits, the carrier first
contended the deceased was a farm laborer and, therefore, exempt from the
Compensation Act. 115 The Beaumont court of civil appeals rejected this con-
tention; although the company could be said to be engaged in an agricul-
turally oriented business, its activities were primarily commercial, according
to the court, and, therefore, the exemption of farm laborers did not apply
to this type of operation. 116 Turning to -the course and scope question raised
by the carrier, the court noted the carrier's agreement to the fact that, if the
deceased employee had been injured while riding in the truck from the
broiler house to his home, such injury would have been sustained in the
course and scope of his employment. 117 Taking into consideration the nature
of the job, the late hour and the age of the boy, the court believed it reason-
able to extend the transportation provision of the statute"18 until the em-
ployee had crossed the highway:
[W]e believe [the deceased employee's] travel to and from home was
closely related to Angelina's business. In no other way could they have
obtained the services of an eight year old boy in the night time and in
a different county. It was a necessity and not an accommodation and
the risks of his travel were as real and job related in crossing the high-
way as in riding in the truck." l9
Rawls is not, of course, governed by the cases involving traveling sales-
men, who are considered to be in the course and scope of their employment
while crossing a street to go to a restaurant as in Shelton v. Standard Insur-
ance Co.120 In fact, Rawls does not fit within any standard exception to the
travel statute or the going to and from work rule. The result, however, is
obviously justified under the facts and circumstances of the case. The prob-
lem is the age-old legal problem of where to draw the line in similar fact
situations. The exception engrafted in Rawls should have only limited appli-
cation, and its application should be considered on a case-by-case basis taking
into account all relevant facts and circumstances.
Course and Scope-Intoxication. In Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v.
Scott"'1 the Tyler court of civil appeals rendered judgment for the carrier,
115. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 2 (1967).
116. 500 S.W.2d at 546-47.
117. Id. at 547.
118. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § lb (1967).
119. 500 S.W.2d at 548.
120. 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965).
121. 513 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ filed).
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holding, as a matter of law, that there was no evidence to establish that the
employee received his injury in the course and scope of his employment.
The evidence concerning the employee's activities during the morning of the
accident was in dispute, but it did appear that the employee was on the em-
ployer's premises and performed some work before he was found uncon-
scious, several hours later, bleeding from the mouth, nose, and ear. Several
witnesses testified that the employee smelled of alcohol while other witnesses
testified that the employee was not drinking or drunk. A bottle of whiskey
was found near the scene of the accident, and the evidence established that
the employee had been sent home three or four days prior to the injury be-
cause he was intoxicated. The employee suffered a severe head injury and
could not remember his whereabouts or his activities from 8:00 a.m. to
10:00 a.m. when he was found, but the evidence did establish that he did
not punch in at the time clock. There was no evidence that the employee
had been directed to do any work or that he did any work subsequent to
8:00 a.m.
The majority in Scott was of the opinion that any inference that -the em-
ployee was engaged in or about the furtherance of his employer's business
or that his injury was of a kind and character that had to do with and origi-
nated in his employer's work or business would be speculation since there
was absolutely no evidence of the employee's activities for two hours. The
employee contended, however, that under the circumstances a presumption
or inference arose that he was in the course and scope of his employment
and that his injury resulted therefrom. The court discussed several Texas
cases 122 following the precept that a presumption arises, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that an employee is injured in the course and scope
of his employment if the employee is found at a place where his duties re-
quire him to be, or where he might have properly been, during the hours
of his work.123 The majority noted that such presumption is rebuttable and
that evidence to the contrary destroys the presumption. 124 Accordingly, the
evidence that the employee did not punch in on the day of his injury, there
being no official record that he was on the job, coupled with the evidence
that he was intoxicated, was, according to the majority opinion, sufficient to
rebut the presumption that the employee was injured in the course and scope
of his employment. 125
In a strong dissenting opinion, 120 Judge Moore stated that because the
claimant received a severe head injury requiring brain surgery, his amnesia
appeared to be legitimate. Moreover, the dissent maintains that the time
122. Elledge v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 312 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); General Ins. Co. v. Jones, 250 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 152 Tex. 99, 255 S.W.2d 502 (1953); Asso-
ciated Employers Lloyds v. Wiggins, 208 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
123. See Annot., 120 A.L.R. 683, 684 (1939).
124. 513 S.W.2d at 250.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 251.
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clock was frequently out of order and this may well have accounted for the
claimant's failure to punch his time card. In addition, the testimony on in-
,toxication was sharply conflicting and an issue regarding intoxication was ap-
parently not submitted to the jury. The dissent concluded that the existing
testimony coupled with the operation of the presumption constituted at least
some evidence of probative force to support the jury's finding. 127 It is sub-
mitted that the dissent's attempt to couple the presumption with the existing
evidence in order to uphold the jury's verdict is erroneous because, as pointed
out by the majority opinion, 1 28 the carrier need only introduce evidence suf-
ficient to rebut the presumption of injury. Thereafter, the presumption dis-
appears and the case must be viewed as if there had been no presumption. 1 29
Course and Scope-Injury by Fellow Employee. ,In Insurance Company of
North America v. Estep'30 the Amarillo court of civil appeals concluded
that an employee, assaulted by a co-employee for apparent personal reasons,
was in the course and scope of his employment and entitled to compensation.
The claimant was employed to weigh cotton and grain brought to the em-
ployer's gin and was on duty twenty-four hours per day. On the night of
the incident the claimant, while preparing a meal in a house provided for
him by his employer, was offended when a truck driver, a co-employee who
had been staying in the house for a few days, came in playing a radio in
a loud fashion. An argument ensued. The claimant was shoved backwards
striking his back on a bed post and falling to the floor thereby sustaining the
injury which resulted in a total and permanent jury verdict. The evidence
was undisputed that there had been previous conflicts between these two men
concerning the volume of the radio. In holding that the claimant's injury
resulted from a risk or hazard incident to his employment and arose out of
and resulted from activities in the furtherance of the employer's affairs or
business, the court stressed the fact that the claimant was on the employer's
premises because his availability was a definite condition of his employment
even though he was paid only for the hours that he worked in the gin of-
fice.13 ' The court relied upon two old decisions from the Eastland court of
civil appeals 132 which held that when the employment requires the employee
to sleep on the premises, he is performing services originating in 'the employ-
er's business while he is on the premises, even when off active duty. The
court held that the co-employee turning up the radio constituted interference
with the claimant's privacy to which he was entitled as he sought to satisfy
his physical needs which in turn would enable him to effectively perform the
duties required of him by his employer. He therefore had the right, if not
127. Id.
128. Id. at 250.
129. Robertson Tank Lines v. Van Cleave, 468 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1971); Empire Gas
& Fuel Co. v. Muegge, 135 Tex. 520, 143 S.W.2d 763 (1940); Mitchell v. Ellis, 374
S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963, writ ref'd).
130. 501 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. Id. at 354-56.
132. Southern Sur. Co. v. Shook, 44 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931,
writ ref'd); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Lawrence, 14 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1929, writ ref'd).
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the duty, to complain of any interference with his privacy and comfort.' 33
Based upon this rationale, the court held the evidence sufficient to support
the jury's verdict.
Strangely, the Estep court gave only lip service to the statutory exclusion
of injuries received by acts of third persons intended to injure the employee
because of reasons personal to the third person and not directed against the
employee because of his employment. 1 3 4 Moreover, Estep failed to cite or
discuss the opinion of the same court in Texas Indemnity Insurance Co. v.
Cheely."135 In Cheely after noting the provisions of the statute and the re-
quirement that the employee must show not only that the injury occurred in
the furtherance of the employer's affairs, but also was of such kind and char-
acter as had to do with and originated in the employer's work, trade, business
or profession, the court quoted the supreme court opinion of Lumbermen's
Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken:"36
'An injury has to do with, and arises out of, the work or business of
the employer, when it results from a risk or hazard which is necessarily
or ordinarily or reasonably inherent in or incident to the conduct of such
work or business. As tersely put by the Supreme Court of Iowa: "What
the law intends is to protect the employee against the risk or hazard
taken in order to perform the master's itask." Paco v. Appanoose
County, 184 Iowa 498, 168 N.W. .[916] 918."'3
The court in Cheely also discussed at length the various cases involving as-
saults by co-employees and noted the general rule that an injury arising out
of disputes and altercations over the manner in which the employer's work
is being done is compensable, albeit the altercation itself is not a part of the
work.13 8 Otherwise, if the assault results from the intent to injure the em-
ployee because of a cause personal to the third person and not directed
against the employee as such or because of his employment, the injury is not
compensable. 139
In Estep the evidence appeared to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that
the assault did not occur as a result of any dispute or disagreement over the
manner of performing the employer's work. The fact that the employee was
required to sleep on the premises, was on twenty-four-hour call, and was en-
titled to "quietude" is certainly no substitute for evidence demonstrating that
the assault grew out of the method of performing the employer's work.
Moreover, the Estep court's own rule requires that the employee, when not
on active duty, be doing what might be reasonably expected of him under
the circumstances. Apparently, the Estep court has held that it can rea-
sonably be expected that employees will participate in altercations over the
volume of a radio even though the volume of the radio does not relate to
or concern the manner of performing the employer's work.
,133. 501 S.W.2d at 356.
134. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(2) (1959).
135. 232 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, writ ref'd).
136. 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W.2d 72 (1922).





Course and Scope of Employment-Borrowed Servant. Two cases arose
during the survey period regarding the problem of "borrowed servants," i.e.,
the general employee of one employer becomes the borrowed or special serv-
ant of another in performing acts on behalf of the latter. The solution to
borrowed servant problems was set forth by the supreme court in Producers
Chemical Co. v. McKay, 140 and specifically approved in J.A. Robinson Sons
v. Wigart.141 The borrowed servant rule referred to by the court provides
that a general employee of one employer may become the borrowed servant
of another in the performing of acts for the latter.142
In Rotge v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n,14 a summary judgment
case, the San Antonio court of civil appeals simply held that the carrier did
not meet its summary judgment burden of establishing, as a matter of law,
that at the -time of the accident the claimant was not a special or borrowed
servant. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court judgment and re-
manded the case for trial. In Home Indemnity Co. v. Draper'4 the supreme
court's solution was applied in a case where the written contract had no ex-
press provisions dealing with the right of control. Accordingly, the Houston
(First District) court of civil appeals held that parol evidence was admissible
to assist in determining the parties' actual intent. 145  After reviewing the
parol evidence the court concluded that the general employer never relin-
quished the right of control over its employee and stated:
We are of the opinion that the testimony in this case shows that actual
'exercise of control' of Draper was never relinquished . . . but on the
contrary was retained . . . throughout the trip and up until the time
of the accident. We believe the testimony was fully admissible as bear-
ing upon the 'right of control' and as evidence of the parties' treatment
of the trip lease agreement as a mere paper formality.'
14
Causation-General Injury. In Colonial Penn Franklin Insurance Co. v.
Mayfield"47 the Amarillo court of civil appeals reviewed the supreme court's
extensive writing on the problem of causation, the evidentiary link required
to establish the connection between the injury and the resulting disability. 148
While the large majority of causation cases deal with heart attack injuries,
the Mayfield case involved a traumatic injury to the employee's penis aggra-
vated by previously asymptomatic Peyronie's disease, resulting in a nervous
aberration which caused total and permanent disability. The court reviewed
various opinions on the subject of causation and lay and medical testimony
140. 366 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1963).
141. 431 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. 1968).
142. Id. at 330, referring to 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227, at 500-
01 (1958).
143. 502 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ).
144. 504 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
145. Id. at 579.
146. Id.
,147. 508 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
148. See Griffin v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 450 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1969); In-
surance Co. of N. America v. Kneten, 440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1969); Parker v. Employers
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969); Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d
324 (Tex. 1968); Insurance Co. of N. America v. Meyers, 411 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1966).
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regarding the sequence of events resulting in disability, and held that such
testimony was sufficient to establish the causal connection between the in-
jury and the disability.1 49
Causation-Heart Attack. The problem of causation with regard to heart
attacks continued during the survey year. Amazingly, in Webb v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.1 0 the Eastland court of civil appeals affirmed a jury
verdict that the plaintiff's heart attack did not occur in the course and scope
of his employment. The court stressed the fact that the jury had apparently
concluded, from an abundance of evidence, that the work being performed
by the plaintiff did not involve unusual stress or exertion. In so holding,
the court reaffirmed the rule that a jury is not bound by opinion testimony,
and that such testimony does not establish material facts as a matter of
law. 151 The rule was important in Webb because the employee's two experts
both connected the heart attack to work activities. The opposite result was
reached in Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Westbrooks,152 wherein the
Amarillo court of civil appeals, after reviewing extensive medical evidence,
held the evidence sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict that the employee
suffered a heart attack as a result of a strain or over-exertion, and that such
heart attack was a producing cause of his death approximately nine months
later. The producing cause issue was supported by expert testimony that the
earlier damage to the heart was a contributing cause to the ultimate death.
The same result was reached by the El Paso court of civil appeals in Conti-
nental Insurance Co. v. Marshall,'" where the cause of the heart attack was
based upon circumstantial evidence and the expert's opinion based upon
hypothetical questions. In affirming the jury verdict, the El Paso court of
civil appeals rejected the carrier's contention that the special issues, taken
from Texas Pattern Jury Charges,14 were incorrect because they did not re-
quire a finding -that the heart attack was the result of an accidental injury,
i.e., an undesigned, unexpected occurrence, traceable to a definite time,
place, and cause. In reply, the court noted that the employee's proof must
always establish, in an accidental injury case as opposed to an occupational
diseases case, that the accident or occurrence is traceable to a definite time,
place, and cause but there has never been a requirement that there be a jury
finding of accidental injury. Under the facts of the Marshall case this hold-
ing by the court is technically correct. 5 5 "Accidental injury" is a phrase
normally used in contradistinction to intentional injury or other excluded risks
or hazards not arising out of the employment and occupational disease."'6
149. 508 S.W.2d at 454.
150. 501 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
151. Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 552, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948); Coxson
v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 142 Tex. 544, 179 S.W.2d 943 (1944). See also Broussard
v. Moon, 431 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1968).
152. 5,11 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ).
153. 506 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ).
154. 2 TEXAS PATrERN JuRY CHARGES §§ 29.02, .04, .05 (1970).
155. 506 S.W.2d at 917.
156. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mincey, 255 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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It is a proof requirement. In accidental injury cases, if the claimant fails
to produce evidence of an event traceable to a definite time, place, and cause,
his cause of action fails. Unless the carrier contends the injury is an occu-
pational disease or other excluded risk, then the submission of accidental in-
jury is superfluous, unless, of course, the claimant's evidence is so weak as
to raise only a surmise or suspicion of the existence of an accidental injury.
The real objection to 'the issues submitted in Marshall is the fact that the
definition of injury in the scope of employment does not direct the jury to con-
sider only undue or unusual strain and/or overexertion as a compensable
cause of the heart attack. This is, of course, the defense that no injury oc-
curred in the course and scope of employment rather than a contention that
there was not an event traceable to a definite time, place, and cause.
In a rather unusual fact situation wherein the claimant attempted to prove
the cause of death by a Louisiana death certificate, the Beaumont court of
civil appeals in Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Hunter57 held
that the death certificate was admissible by virtue of article 373 la 58 to prove
the fact of the employee's death, but could not prove the cause of death. A
Waco court of civil appeals opinion' 59 discussing the intent of article 3731a
was cited and relied upon by the court. That case held that birth records,
death records, reports of coroners, and other similar public records are gen-
erally not admissible to prove the issue of accident, suicide, etc., when these
matters are at issue in civil litigation, since the compilation of the statistics
are for public purposes only.' 60
General Injury-Good Cause. To perfect a claim for compensation, an em-
ployee must give notice of injury and file a claim for compensation within
the time prescribed by the statute.' 0 ' The statute also provides that "for
good cause" strict compliance with the limitations may be waived. 16 2 There
have been numerous good cause cases litigated throughout the years,' 63 but
recently the supreme court has more strictly required reasonable conduct on
the part of an employee in filing his claim.'6 4  For example, in Continental
Casualty 'Co. v. Cook'615 the claimant was injured on March 2, 1967, under-
went surgery on October 17, 1967, and filed a claim with the Industrial Acci-
Eastland 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Agan, 252 S.W.2d 743(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ ref'd).
157. 503 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
158. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3731a (Supp. 1974).
159. Armstrong v. Employers Cas. Co., 357 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1962, no writ).
160. Id. at 171, 172, cited at 503 S.W.2d at 821.
161. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967).
162. Id.
163. E.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brantley, 402 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1966);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Leathers, 395 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1965); Texas Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Beasley, 391 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1965); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hancox,
162 Tex. 565, 349 S.W.2d 102 (1961); Hawkins v. Safety Cas. Co., 146 Tex. 381, 207
S.W.2d 370 ('1948).
164. E.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hughes, 497 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1973); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1969); Moronko v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co.,
435 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1968); accord, Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Renfro, 496 S.W.2d
227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ dism'd).
165. 515 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1974).
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dent Board on January 12, 1968, ten months after the injury. The supreme
court noted that although the claimant injured his back and was in pain and
under medical treatment, he did not miss any work until October 5, 1967,
at which time he was advised to undergo back surgery which he did on Oc-
tober 17. The claimant testified that he believed his injury to be trivial until
the myelogram was performed. By his own admission, he recognized the
seriousness of his injury at that time, and remained hospitalized for approxi-
mately ten days. He remained absent from work for an additional thirty-
four days. When he returned to work he was only able to work part time
and was placed in a different job at a reduced salary.
The supreme court held that there was evidence to support the jury's good
cause finding until October 5, 1967, the date of the myelogram, but not after
that date.166 In the court's opinion the case was controlled by Texas Em-
ployers' Insurance Ass'n v. Portley.167  Quoting from Portley, the Court
held: "[T]he plaintiff had a manifestly serious and disabling condition of
which he was fully aware. At the very least, it was a condition which we
hold should and would have led any reasonably prudent person under the
same or similar circumstances to protect his rights by filing his claim."'6 8
The court also maintained, however, that there was some evidence of other
grounds of good cause including the fact that all of the medical bills for the
back surgery were paid by the employer or its compensation carrier, as well
as the fact the claimant received compensation during his recuperation
period. In addition, the claimant testified the employer told him that all of
the requirements for filing a claim had been fulfilled. Accordingly, the court
exercised its discretion and remanded the case, in the interest of justice, for
a new trial.
In Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Hubbard'69 the supreme court re-
versed the court of civil appeals judgment and affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment granting the carrier's motion for summary judgment. The back injury
in question occurred when the employee was lifting sacks. After one month,
the employee left his job because he was unable to work. He worked at
several subsequent jobs, but was never able to do heavy work. His claim
for compensation was filed fifteen months after the accident. His good cause
excuse was that he believed his injuries were trivial and he relied upon his
own doctor's opinion that his spinal compression probably could not be traced
to the injury. The claimant relied upon the Texarkana court of civil appeals
opinion in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wilson.' 70  The supreme court,
however, distinguished the Wilson case. In Wilson three doctors, two of
whom were employer related, told the employee her condition was not job
related. As soon as the independent physician changed his mind, the em-
ployee filed a claim. The distinction between Wilson and Hubbard, accord-
ing to the supreme court, was that in Wilson there was affirmative medical
166. Id. at 262-63.
167. 153 Tex. 62, 263 S.W.2d 247 (1953).
168. 515 S.W.2d at 263, quoting 153 Tex. at 67, 263 S.W.2d at 250.
169. 518 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1974).
170. 495 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1975]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
opinion that the condition was not job related and in Hubbard the employee's
own doctor was simply unable to say within reasonable medical probability
that the condition or disability was job related.' 71 Moreover, the court
pointed out that there was no allegation by the claimant that his doctor or
any other doctor ever told him that his condition was not serious.1 72 In re-
jecting the employee's contention and affirming the carrier's summary judg-
ment, the supreme court again relied upon the Portley decision. 173
In another good cause case decided during the survey year, the court held,
in harmony with past precedent, that reliance upon statements of employers
or their agents, servants or employees may establish good cause for a delay
in filing a claim.' 74 Similarly, reliance upon representations by an insurance
adjuster was held to constitute good cause.' 75 In contrast, it has recently
been held that the excuse that !the claimant wanted to wait until she could
determine whether she could draw unemployment compensation was insuffi-
cient as a matter of law. 176
Specific Injuries-Extending to and Affecting Other Parts of the Body. In
a bizarre fact situation, the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals affirmed a
verdict of total and permanent disability where the jury found that an injury
to the employee's left hand extended to and affected numerous parts of his
body. In Western Casualty & Surety -Co. v. Gonzales 77 in which the su-
preme court has granted a writ of error, the employee cut the palm side of
his left middle finger; the cut apparently severed the tendon. After exten-
sive medical treatment, tendon transplants, and physical therapy, the finger
was amputated. The employee testified that from the time of the injury he
experienced a weakness in his left hand and left arm and soon thereafter he
experienced pain in his left shoulder, chest, and back. One doctor adminis-
tered serial injections into his arms and then into his legs above each knee.
Later, the employee suffered general paralysis for approximately two weeks,
followed by low back pains and numbness in the lower extremities. He
walked with a bilateral antalgic gait which affected his back. His doctor pre-
scribed a back brace and a walking cane. There was medical testimony
which, considered liberally, connected all of the employee's complaints and
symptoms to the original injury. There was also lay testimony that the claim-
ant had been a superior employee prior to the accident, but was completely
unable to perform any type of work subsequent thereto.
The carrier in Gonzales objected to the special issues because they simply
inquired whether the injury to the left hand extended to and affected any
part of the claimant's body other than his left hand. 178 Even though this
171. Id. at 580.
172. Id. at 581.
173. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. King, 510 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston fist Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
175. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Echols, 508 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tex-
arkana 1974, no writ).
176. See Edwards v. Liberty Mutual Life Ins. Co., 503 S.W.2d 829, 832-33 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
177. 506 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ granted).
178. Id. at 307.
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precise submission had been condemned by the supreme court in Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Marmolejo,1 79 the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals sus-
tained the submission, holding that the inferential rebuttal issue inquiring
whether the injury was confined to the left arm below the shoulder, which
the jury found not to be so confined, gave certainty to the jury's answers to
the previous special issues on extent and effect of the injury. Moreover, the
court rejected the carrier's contention that the evidence was legally insuffi-
cient to support the jury's finding that the hand injury extended to and af-
fected other parts of the body. The only evidence was that the claimant
suffered pain in other parts of his body other than his left hand where the
original injury occurred. While recognizing the well established rule that
pain in another part of the body resulting from use of an injured specific
member does not convert the specific injury into a general injury and will
not support a finding of general incapacity, 180 the court nevertheless held that
there was evidence of general disability sufficient to support the jury's ver-
dict.' s ' ,It is hoped that the supreme court will reverse this decision since
the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals' recitation of the evidence does not
contain any reference to any testimony which would support the jury's verdict
of extension of the specific injury to the left middle finger to other parts of
the body.
Death Benefits-Beneficiaries. A Waco court of civil appeals decision has
again demonstrated the danger inherent to a carrier in settling death claims.
In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Crowley' 8 2 the Industrial Accident
Board approved a settlement of a death claim asserted by the wife of a de-
ceased workman. An adult daughter, the stepdaughter of the employee's
wife, not a party to the settlement, who had no knowledge of the settlement
or the negotiations with the carrier, timely filed a claim for death benefits
and timely appealed the denial of the claim. The Waco court of civil appeals
held that the district court had jurisdiction of the adult daughter's claim and
further found that the evidence fully supported the jury's verdict that the
adult daughter was dependent upon the deceased workman at the time of
his death. In so holding, the court rejected the carrier's contention that an
adult married daughter, as a matter of law, could not be dependent on her
father. 1 3 This contention is obviously without merit.' 84 Accordingly the trial
court's judgment awarding one-half of the death benefits to the dependent
married daughter, even though the full death benefits had been paid to the
stepmother under the settlement agreement, was affirmed.
179. 383 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. 1964).
180. E.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Shannon, 462 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1970);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Marmolejo, 383 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. 1964).
181. 383 S.W.2d at 382.
182. 509 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
183. Id. at 941.
184. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Arnold, 127 Tex. 245, 92 S.W.2d 1019
(1936); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cassavaugh, 486 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Turner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 401 S.W.2d 618
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Moore, 386
S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Postal Mut. Indem. Co.
v. Penn, 165 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
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In a case of first impression in Texas, it was held that a recognized, illegit-
imate child of a deceased employee was entitled ,to death benefits by virtue
of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. In Gonzales
v. Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n'8 5 the Dallas court of civil appeals held
that, under the authority of the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety ,Co.,'8 6 the discriminatory exclusion of
recognized illegitimate children bore no significant relation to the purpose of
the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, and no rational basis for the dis-
crimination appeared in -the statutory provisions relating to benefits payable
to minor children or in the provisions for distribution of death benefits ac-
cording to the law of descent and distribution. The court rejected the car-
rier's contention that possible problems in locating illegitimate children and
determining uncertain claims of parentage provided a rational basis for such
discrimination. 1
87
Death Benefits-Filing Notice of Claim. In Petroleum Casualty Co. v.
Canales188 a deceased employee was injured and died three days later. The
claim for death benefits was not filed with the Industrial Accident Board until
approximately one year after the employee's death.
The deceased employee's wife, to establish good cause, testified that she
had not received any claim forms from the Industrial Accident Board or her
husband's employer, -that she was uneducated and did not speak or write Eng-
lish and that she believed that her husband's employer would itake care of
whatever was necessary. There was no evidence that she was ever misled
or influenced by the employer or the carrier. The Houston (First District)
court of civil appeals held, as a matter of law, that there was no evidence
to support the finding of good cause, relying upon Allstate Insurance Co.
v. King,189 which held that ignorance of the six-months filing requirement
does not excuse a failure to file a claim promptly.
The widow also contended, however, that the amended provisions of sec-
tion 7a, 190 amended in 1971, was retroactive and applicable to her claim.
Section 7a was amended to provide that when the association or subscriber
has been given notice of an injury and failed to file an employer's report of
injury with the Industrial Accident Board, as required by the Act, the limita-
tion provisions in section 4a do not begin to run against the claim until the
report is filed. The court in Canales held, however, that since the claimant
did not have good cause, her rights were extinguished and could not be re-
vived by an amendment to the statute occurring subsequent to the extinguish-
ment of her cause of action. In so holding the court specifically held that
the section 7a amendment was procedural and not substantive because it con-
cerned the time within which a claimant must initiate a claim and did not
185. 509 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
186. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
187. 509 S.W.2d at 426.
188. 499 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
189. 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1969).
190. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 7a (Supp. 1974).
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concern rights and duties which gave rise to a claim. 191 It was also noted,
however, that there was nothing in the statute which indicated the legislative
intent to apply the provisions of the amendment retroactively. In addition
to the wife, the employee's three minor children also asserted claims for death
benefits. The court held, in accordance with established law,192 that the dis-
qualification of minority constitutes good cause for failing to timely file a
claim.
Death Claim-Gross Negligence. In Ballenger v. Mobil Oil Corp.193 suit
was instituted pursuant to section 5 of article 8306194 to recover damages
against Mobil for its gross negligence in causing the death of the plaintiffs'
decedent. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and rendered a judg-
ment in favor of the widow and surviving minor children after reviewing the
evidence and finding that Mobil had demonstrated that it exercised "some
care" with respect to the factors causing the accident, such being sufficient
to rebut a prima facie case of gross negligence. 195
Dual Employment. The continuing problem of dual employment was con-
sidered in Lesco Transportation Co. v. Campbell,196 a plea of privilege case.
The contention of the injured workman was that at the time of his injury,
he was an employee of Lesco. There was not only a lessor-lessee relation-
ship involved in this case, but an employee-employer relationship as well, as
the workman had executed a written lease agreement leasing his own vehicle
to Lesco. After a lengthy review of the evidence, the Texarkana court of
civil appeals concluded, based upon the supreme court's exhaustive opinion
in Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Bottom,197 that the workman was not
an employee at the time of his injury because when an employee abandons
the scope and course of his employment and engages in personal work that
does not in any way further an employer's interest, -such a deviation defeats a
claim for compensation when injury occurs.
Independent Contractor vs. Employee. Another difficult area was involved
in a decision by the El Paso court of civil appeals which appears to have
reached an absurd result and added considerable confusion to this area. In
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Scott'98 the jury found the injured workman to be
an employee of Sam Fitzhugh Water Well Service at the time he received
injuries which resulted in total and permanent disability. The evidence
demonstrated that the claimant was employed, full time, as the foreman of
a ranch, but had, for several years, also operated a part time windmill re-
pair service for which he had acquired the necessary tools together with a
191. 499 S.W.2d at 737.
192. Latcholia v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 410 Tex. 231, 167 S.W.2d 164(1942); Nunnery v. Texas Cas. Ins. Co., 362 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962,
no writ).
193. 488 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1974).
194. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (1967).
195. 488 F.2d at 712, 713.
196. 500 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ).
1197. 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963).
198. 511 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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truck equipped with a winch and gin pole. The day prior to the accident,
the claimant was contacted by the owner of Fitzhugh Water Well Service
who was then in the process of repairing a windmill for a local rancher.
Due to the complexities of the work Fitzhugh needed assistance, but the
claimant could not participate in the job because his full-time job required
his presence the next day. He did agree, however, to perform the windmill
work the following day. After arriving at the site of the windmill, the two
men discussed the particular problem and agreed as to its solution and that
they would continue working until the mill was repaired.
The El Paso court of civil appeals in Scott recognized that the test to be
used to determine if the claimant was an employee was the right of control
as to the details of the work, and, in the absence of a written employment
contract, the testimony of the parties determines the right of control. 199 In
determining the evidentiary issues against the carrier, the court emphasized
the claimant's testimony that he simply did what he was told to do, that he
was being paid by the hour and not the job, and that he had no freedom
as to the hours of his actual work once he had agreed to complete the job.
The court also noted the factors tending to establish independent contractor
status that were set out in Anchor Casualty Co. v. Hartsfield.200 The factors
included the fact that the work required special skill on the part of the claim-
ant, the fact that he was self-employed and performing the exact type of work
requiring his special skill, the fact that he furnished his own tools, equipment,
and vehicle, maintained his tools, equipment, and vehicle, was performing
only one particular job, received a flat rate out of which he had -to pay his
own social security and income tax as well as all other expenses. The court
distinguished Hartsfield, however, by stating that there was no evidence of
the exercise of any control over the details of the work in that case, thus
rendering the workman an employee for workmen's compensation pur-
poses. 20 1
Wage Rate. The technical issue of wage rate has been a recurring prob-
lem, and this survey year was no exception. In Barrientos v. Texas Employ-
ers' Insurance Ass'n, 20 2 the employee, a Mexican citizen, eighteen years of
age at the time of trial, came to the United States and worked intermittently
until 1971 when he suffered the injury giving rise to a compensation claim.
Among the issues raised on appeal was whether or not the jury's wage rate
finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
The jury found the claimant's average weekly wage to be $70.00, but the
employee contended that had he not been injured he would have been earn-
ing at least $175.00 per week. The Amarillo court of civil appeals reviewed
the evidence in light of the fact that the employee was attempting to establish
wage rate on the basis of the "just and fair" provision of the statute20 3 and
199. Id. at 414.
200. 390 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1965).
201. Id. at 470.
202. 507 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
203. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(3) (1967).
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had failed to request an instruction that the jury consider his potential earn-
ing capacity. In holding that the evidence justified the jury's answer and,
in fact, would have supported a lesser amount, the Amarillo court of civil
appeals also rejected the claimant's argument that he should have been al-
lowed to inform the jury that he could receive no more than $49.00 per week
for 401 weeks regardless of the amount of the "just and fair" average weekly
wage found by the jury. This argument, the court concluded, was without
merit for it is considered to be a much better practice not "to inform the jury
of the legal effect of its answers to special issues."
20 4
In an opinion concerned solely with the issue of wage rate, the Beaumont
court of civil appeals held that an employee who intentionally limited his
earnings to protect his social security did not remove himself from the "class"
of employees who did not so confine their earnings for purposes of determin-
ing wage rate. In Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. McMahon20 5 the car-
rier contended that the intentional limitation of earnings was unique and took
the claimant out of the "class" of similar employees working full time. A
divided court, Chief Justice Dies writing the first opinion, with a concurring
opinion by Justice Stephenson, rejected the carrier's contention, holding that
the word "class" referred to the type of employment and not the manner or
mode of compensation. Thus, testimony from other employees of the same
class as that of the claimant, even though they did not limit their earnings,
was cogent with regard to the issue of said employee's wage rate. In so hold-
ing, the court relied upon Traders & General Insurance Co. v. Nored206 and
rejected the carrier's attempted distinction of the Nored case which was based
upon the fact that the plaintiff in Nored testified that he was willing to and
would have accepted employment if available even though he would then be
deprived of his social security benefits. In McMahon the claimant testified
he did not work for two hundred and ten days in the year preceding his injury
because he did not want to lose his social security. The dissent by Justice
Keith expressed doubt as to the validity of the majority's conclusion concern-
ing the word "class," but did not specifically dissent from that holding. Jus-
tice Keith did point out, however, that the evidence regarding wages of other
employees demonstrated that such men were paid on an hourly basis, at dif-
fering hourly rates, whereas the claimant was paid on a piece work basis. 207
Judge Keith in McMahon relied upon a long line of cases which establish
the rule that where the evidence discloses differing wage rates among similar
employees, it is error to submit the wage issue on the basis of subdivision
2.208
A rather strange procedural problem faced the Houston (First District)
court of civil appeals in Texas Compensation Insurance Co. v. Matthews.20 9
204. 507 S.W.2d at 904, citing Export Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 401 S.W.2d 324 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Wil-
liams. 935 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
205. 509 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
206. 341 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
207. Id. at 494.
208. 509 S.W.2d at 670 (dissenting opinion).
209. 510 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston ['lst Dist.] 1974, no writ).
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The employee and the carrier stipulated the daily wage rate applicable to
the employee on the date of injury as $18.60. In addition, the jury heard
evidence that immediately prior to the date of injury, the claimant's normal
work week was forty hours. The jury was required to determine, in dollars
and cents, the difference between the average weekly wage before injury and
the average weekly earning capacity during any period of partial incapacity.
The jury answered: "$93.00 a week before the injury and $75.00 a week
after the injury. '210 The trial court calculated wage rate by using the statu-
tory formula in connection with the stipulated daily wage and then subtract-
ing the result from the jury's $75.00 finding. The court of civil appeals held
that this was error because:
The stipulation of a daily wage rate 'applicable' to the plaintiff on the
date of injury must be taken to mean the average daily wage rate con-
templated under Paragraph (2) or (3) of Article 8309, See. 1. We
consider that the stipulation was entered into in order to eliminate the
necessity of making proof of average weekly wages as required under
Sections (1), (2) and (3) of Article 8309, Sec. 1.211
The court noted that the jury was required to find average weekly wage be-
fore injury in order to answer a special issue, but were not given instructions
with regard to the manner of determining weekly wage. -In reviewing the
jury's answer, however, the court concluded that it was obvious what the jury
intended and, therefore, ordered entry of a judgment in conformity with the
jury's answer. 212 This case is illustrative of the continuing problem of stipu-
lating wage rate. It appears that the employee thought he was stipulating
actual wages whereas the carrier believed it was stipulating wages as calcu-
lated under the Compensation Act. Even so, a correct stipulation would not
obviate the fact that the jury must be advised of the actual wages earned
prior to injury so that a lucid jury argument may be made with regard to re-
duced earning ability during partial incapacity.
In another case decided by the Houston (First District) court of civil ap-
peals, Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. King,213 it was held that when the
carrier answered interrogatories and stated its "position in dollars and cents
as to what amount [the employee's] average weekly wage under the Work-
men's Compensation Act was as of the date alleged, ' 214 this was an uncontro-
verted judicial admission of average weekly wage sufficient to establish the
employee's wage rate for the purposes of computing her compensation rate
for total and permanent benefits.
Medical and Nursing Services. This is a continuing area of litigation. In
Home Indemnity Co. v. Draper215 one of the issues concerned nursing serv-
ices rendered to a quadriplegic by his wife. The reasonable cost of such
nursing services was established through the testimony of the Chief of the
210. Id. at 642.
211. Id. at 644.
212. Id. at 644, 645.
213. 510 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
214. Id. at 377-78.
215. 504 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Department of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation at a local hospital. The
carrier, while acknowledging that a wife can recover for nursing services ren-
dered to a husband, contended that the evidence failed to establish the rea-
sonable cost of the nursing services rendered since the wife was not a quali-
fied LVN and all of the testimony as to the basis for compensation was with
regard to wages paid to an LVN. The Houston (First District) court of civil
appeals summarily overruled this argument by holding that the testimony
gave the jury a proper basis on which to calculate the value of the services
rendered.216  The carrier also contended that the special issue regarding
nursing services should have inquired whether the employee "expended or
incurred" any amount for reasonably required nursing services which the car-
rier failed to furnish. The court also rejected this contention, holding that
such language in the issues would tend incorrectly to mislead the jury into be-
lieving that the employee must have actually expended money or incurred
debt for the nursing services before recovery would be allowed under the
workmen's compensation laws. 217
The opposite result was reached in Barrientos v. Texas Employers'
Insurance Ass'n,218 where the Amarillo court of civil appeals rejected an em-
ployee's claim for nursing services, stating that there was no evidence that
the employee actually paid for the services or incurred an obligation to pay
for the services. The distinguishing feature of Barrientos as compared to
Draper is that in Barrientos the nursing services were rendered by two
families with whom the employee was living in Mexico, and, moreover, the
two families admitted that no payment had been made nor had there been
any agreement that the employee would pay for the nursing services. Al-
ternatively, the court also held in Barrientos that there was no evidence of
the reasonable value of the services furnished to the employee by either
family nor any evidence as to the wage rate applicable to a person performing
similar services. 219
In Threet v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n220 the Tyler court of civil
appeals was concerned with the interpretation of an open medical provision
in an agreed final judgment. It has become common practice in recent years
to use open medical provisions in agreed final judgments rather than requir-
ing the employee to make a claim for medical services to the 'Board every
six months.221 This appears to be one of the first reported cases wherein
a court has been called upon to enforce such an open medical provision. The
employee filed suit against the carrier for the original injury and by consent
judgment compromised and settled his compensation claim. The agreed final
judgment included a provision for one year open medical at the direction of
doctors designated, in writing, by the carrier. Subsequently, the employee
requested authorization for treatment from a chiropractor and the carrier au-
thorized such treatment, in writing, but limited the treatment to a thirty-day
216. Id. at 576.
217. Id. at 576, 577.
218. 507 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
219. Id. at 902.
220. 516 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
221. Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Supp. 1974).
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period. The letter of authorization also stated that the thirty-day period
would not automatically be extended. However, the employee did request
and receive a written thirty-day extension. Although unclear from the rec-
ord, the employee apparently received chiropractic treatments past the end
of the thirty-day extension, and the carrier apparently refused to pay for the
treatment rendered past that date.
The Tyler court of civil appeals in Threet held that the terms and pro-
visions of the consent judgment, entered of record by the sanction and au-
thorization of the district court, became a written contract enforceable under
the general rules relating to contract construction. The employee contended
that the section of the judgment authorizing treatment should be interpreted
as allowing the doctor designated by the carrier to treat him for the pre-
scribed one year. The carrier, on the other hand, contended that the inter-
pretation to be applied was that the carrier would have complete control of
the doctor treating the employee and such control could be for a specific time
period at its option. In other words, if the carrier re-examined the needs and
requirements of the employee and designated another doctor for another
period of treatment, this was its prerogative. In construing the contract, the
court specifically noted that when the carrier first designated the thirty-day
treatment period the employee did not complain, but acquiesced in the inter-
pretation, and, in fact, asked for a thirty-day extension. There was a com-
plete absence of evidence that the carrier ever attempted to modify the terms
of the judgment by attempting to provide medical treatments for less than
one year, and the record did not demonstrate that the carrier was not ready,
willing, and able to furnish additional medical aid if requested by the em-
ployee. Accordingly, the court held that the carrier, in seeking close super-
vision over the treatment given to the employee, was properly within the con-
struction applicable to the contractual terms, thus denying the employee a
recovery on the medical bill in question.
Benefits of Surgery. Sections 12e and 12b of the Workmen's Compensation
Act 222 provide a procedure whereby the employee or carrier may demand
a surgical operation under the supervision of the Industrial Accident Board.
An unusual fact situation gave rise to the supreme court's interpretation of
these provisions in Wright v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n. 223 The em-
ployee, a welder, injured his left knee and immediately sought treatment
from an orthopedic surgeon of his choice which resulted in a knee operation.
After the operation he continued to have difficulty with his knee and ulti-
mately his attorney filed a demand for surgery with the Industrial Accident
Board pursuant to the terms of section 12e. 224 A Board-ordered medical ex-
amination resulted in a recommendation for additional surgery, and the
Board ordered the operation. The employee, however, for reasons of his
own, refused to submit to additional surgery. The trial resulted in a jury
verdict of total and permanent loss of use of the left leg. The jury failed
to find that the surgical operation ordered by the Industrial Accident Board
222. Id. §§ 12b, e (1967).
223. 504 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1974).
224. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12e (Supp. 1974).
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would have materially and beneficially improved 'the employee's condition
and the trial court entered judgment awarding two hundred weeks of com-
pensation.
While the supreme court specifically agreed 225 with the court of civil ap-
peals' interpretation of the statute requiring the reduction in the judgment
to fifty-two weeks of compensation in Wright, it did not agree that the court
could hold, as a matter of law, that the surgery would have materially and
beneficially improved the employee's condition. Relying on Indemnity In-
surance Co. of North America v. Jones,226 and several out-of-state cases, 227
the claimant argued that sections 12e and 12b were inapplicable since the
provisions provide for only one operation, and the Board's order related to
a second surgery. The supreme court rejected this argument because the first
surgery was performed solely at the request of the employee upon the advice
of his own doctor. The court observed that the provisions of the statute
would be effectively nullified if surgery, arranged for by the employee, would
prevent the Board from ordering another operation as specifically provided
by the statute.228  The court then considered the evidence relating to the
beneficial effects of the surgery, holding that because the provisions of the
statute were penal in nature, the burden of proof was on the carrier to
demonstrate that the operation would materially and beneficially improve the
employee's condition. In the view of the supreme court, the jury was entitled
to reject the medical testimony and rely upon the employee's 'testimony.
Suit To Set Aside Board Award. In a case reminiscent of the Krenek v.
Epps Supermarket #2, Inc.229 decision, the employee in Commercial Stand-
ard Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Martin23 0 sued Commercial Standard In-
surance Company and Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Insurance Com-
pany to set aside an award of the Board. The judgment of the trial court
was apparently rendered against both defendants. Only Commercial Stand-
ard Fire & Marine Insurance Company appealed, contending that, since it
was not a party to the Industrial Accident Board proceedings, the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction and could not render a judgment against it. The
Texarkana court of civil appeals sustained this contention, relying upon the
well established rule that all parties to a suit must have been parties to the
proceedings before the Industrial Accident Board before jurisdiction is ac-
quired. 23 1 The supreme court, in a per curiam opinion 232 affirmed the court
of civil appeals' reversal of the trial court judgment, but noted that the court
of civil appeals should have rendered judgment dismissing the cause rather
than rendering judgment that the plaintiff take nothing.
225. 504 S.W.2d at 396.
226. 299 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1927, writ dism'd).
227. Hamlin v. Industrial Comm'n, 77 Ariz. 100, 267 P.2d 736 (1954); City of Olive
Hill v. Parsons, 306 Ky. 83, 206 S.W.2d 41 (1947).
228. 504 S.W.2d at 396.
229. 377 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, no writ).
230. 501 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973), jdgmnt modified per cu-
tian, 505 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. 1974).
231. 501 S.W.2d at 432.




Compromise Settlement Agreement-Suit To Set Aside. In a suit to set
aside a compromise settlement agreement, the Waco court of civil appeals
reaffirmed the general rule2 3 that such settlement agreements can only be
set aside for fraudulent representations relied upon by the employee. In
Mullens v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n23 4 the employee contended that
the compromise settlement agreement should have been set aside on the
grounds of mutual mistake of the parties concerning the nature and extent
of the injuries. Soon after entering into a compromise settlement agreement,
approved by the Board, the employee's neck condition worsened and she un-
derwent surgery for two ruptured cervical discs in addition to a cervical fu-
sion. The employee filed suit to set aside the compromise settlement agree-
ment. The trial court disregarded the answers to the special issues concern-
ing mutual mistake and entered judgment that the employee take nothing.
The Waco court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court judgment, holding
that a compromise settlement agreement can only be set aside for fraudulent
representations and there was no evidence of any fraudulent representations.
Thus, an employee's allegations of mutual mistake as to the nature and ex-
tent of injuries and disability is insufficient, as a matter of law, to set aside
compromise settlement agreements.
In Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Sprabery,23 5 a plea of privilege
case, the employee brought an original action in the district court of Wichita
County, seeking to set aside a fraudulently procured compromise settlement
agreement. The employee alleged that he was referred to a doctor by -the
carrier and underwent back surgery. The doctor and another employee of
the carrier, after the employee's back surgery, both represented to him that
he had no permanent disability and would be able to return to his usual occu-
pation. The employee offered evidence that he could have recovered more
for his claim than the amount for which it was settled which is, of course,
a portion of the employee's proof in attempting to set aside a compromise
settlement agreement.23 6 The Fort Worth court of civil appeals concluded
that it could be inferred that the doctor's statement that the employee could
return to his normal occupation was untrue and that such a misrepresentation
by a doctor would constitute fraud within the meaning of the statute.
2 37
Moreover, the court noted that it was not essential in a cause of action for
fraud that the party charged with the fraud know the falsity of the repre-
sentation. 238 Alternatively, the court held that the statement by the carrier's
adjuster, in effect paraphrasing the doctor's statement, even though inno-
cently made, could be construed as being false and thereby constitute con-
structive or legal fraud entitling the employee to set aside the settlement
agreement.
233. See, e.g., Brannon v. Specific Employers Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 289, 224 S.W.2d 466
(1949); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Johnston, 123 Tex. 592, 72 S.W.2d 583 (1934); Bullock
v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, writ ref'd).
234. 507 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
235. 507 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
236. See Brannon v. Specific Employers Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 289, 224 S.W.2d 466
(1949).
237. 507 S.W.2d at 343.
238. Id. at 344.
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Variance. The age-old problem of variance between the identity of the in-
jury presented to the Industrial Accident Board and the injury presented to
the district court on appeal was again considered in Select Insurance Co. v.
Patton.23 9 The general rule is, of course, that the employee must plead and
prove presentation of a claim to the Industrial Accident Board which has
been acted upon by the Board. The claim asserted in district court must
be the same as that filed with and acted upon by the Board. If there is
a variance between the two claims, then the court does not acquire jurisdic-
tion. 240 In Patton the employee timely filed notice of injury and claim for
compensation dated September 25, 1970, alleging the date of accident as Au-
gust 12, 1970. She described her condition as: "the left rib cartilage be-
came inflamed and is causing swelling of the rib cage. It is very painful.
It was caused by constant lifting of heavy pricing catalogues during my job
as pricing clerk."'241 An amended claim form was prepared and filed with
the Board in October 1972 and the date of injury was listed as "on or about
July 29, 1970." The description of the injury was amended to read: "I was
flipping a particularly heavy pricing catalogue when I felt a severe straining,
pulling and tearing of the left front side of my rib cage, causing me severe
pain. Shortly thereafter, my rib cage began to swell and became inflamed
from this injury. ' 242 The employee's petition alleged the same facts as did
the amended notice of injury and claim for compensation. The carrier ar-
gued that the first notice filed by the employee described an occupational
disease rather than an accidental injury. Admitting that a claim may be
amended before the Board acts on the claim, the carrier argued that the
amended claim filed by the employee describing an accidental injury was not
a permissible enlargement of the first claim since the amended claim was not
filed within six months of the injury and the employee had not shown good
cause for the delay, and accordingly, that the district court did not have
jurisdiction of the employee's claim.
The Amarillo court of civil appeals in Patton, however, relied upon John-
son v. American General Insurance Co.,243 wherein the supreme court em-
phasized, as cases have in the past, 244 that the function of the claim filed
with the Board is to provide information as to the occurrence and to serve
as a proper basis for investigation and determination of the claim.245 The
claim form is not intended to be governed by strict rules or formalities, and
it is not required that employees know the correct legal classification of the
injury nor the exact medical name of the condition, injury, or disease. 246
239. 506 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
240. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1971); Solo-
mon v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 347 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1961, writ ref'd).
241. 506 S.W.2d at 680.
242. Id.
243. 464 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1971).
244. See, e.g., Booth v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 132 Tex. 237, 123 S.W.2d 322
(1938).
245. 506 S.W.2d at 681.
246. See Lewis v. American Sur. Co., 143 Tex. 286, 184 S.W.2d 137 (1945); Booth
v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 132 Tex. 237, 123 S.W.2d 322 (1938); Liberty Mut.
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The Amarillo court of civil appeals specifically noted that the first claim filed
by the employee was filled out and filed by the claimant herself.247 Ap-
parently, the standardized Industrial Accident Board form was used to report
the injury and such report gave a definite place of occurrence, a definite but
inaccurate date of occurrence, and a definite area of injury. The court held
that the omission of a particular event causing the injury did not constitute
notice only of an occupational disease and under the liberal construction re-
quired under the Compensation Act, the claim was legally sufficient to report
an accidental injury.248
Exclusiveness of Remedy. In Paradissis v. Royal Indemnity Co.249 the em-
ployee filed suit against the compensation carder alleging damages for per-
sonal injuries resulting from an alleged common law tort committed by the
carrier. The claimant, in 1962, received back injuries in the course and
scope of his employment, and the carrier paid total and permanent disability
benefits as awarded by the Industrial Accident Board in 1965. In addition,
the carrier continued to pay for medical services being furnished by an ortho-
pedic surgeon. In 1972 suit was filed subsequent to the employee's request
for a Board hearing on the issue of nursing services and refusal to provide
other medical services. Before the hearing was held suit was filed against
the carrier alleging that the carder became liable to the employee for the
medical services which it had failed and refused to furnish. It was further
alleged that the carrier knew, as early as 1966, that the employee suffered
from a psychoneurosis but negligently refused and failed to provide psychi-
atric services, insisting that the employee receive all of his treatment from
an orthopedic surgeon. The employee further alleged that had he undergone
psychiatric treatment in 1966, he would have recovered and again become
gainfully employed. Relying upon cases in other jurisdictions dealing with
intentional torts, 250 the employee argued that the concealment of his true con-
dition by the carrier amounted to an independent common law tort from
which he suffered new and independent injuries. At the outset, however,
the supreme court specifically noted that the employee's pleadings were cast
in terms of negligence or gross negligence, and accordingly, it was unneces-
sary for the court to determine the effect of fraud or intentional torts. Hav-
ing avoided that question, the court held that negligence of a carrier in pro-
viding or failing to provide medical services is actionable under the work-
men's compensation laws only. The court noted that the compensation law
provided an adequate remedy, since the employee had the right to obtain
copies of all medical reports which had been furnished to the carrier and if
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 410 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Pacific Indem. Co. v. Woodall, 253 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1952, writ
ref'd); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dickson, 145 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1940, writ ref'd).
247. 506 S.W.2d at 681.
248. Id. at 684. Additionally, the court held the evidence was legally and factually
sufficient to support the jury's finding of "accidental injury," i.e., an undesigned, unto-
ward event traceable to a definite time, place and cause. See also Olson v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972).
249. 507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1974).
250. See cases cited id. at 528.
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dissatisfied to request a change of medical treatment from the Board.2"1
Moreover, the Board has continuing jurisdiction to render successive awards
and to determine the liability of the Association for the cost or expense of
the medical services furnished to the employee until the carrier has fully dis-
charged its obligation under the law, which is now lifetime medical. 25 2 Thus,
the supreme court affirmed the judgments of the court of civil appeals and
trial court sustaining the carrier's plea to the jurisdiction of the court and dis-
missing the case.
In Hedgeman v. Berwind Railway Service Co.2 53 an employee sued his
employer and the employer's compensation carrier for an unlisted occupa-
tional disease arising prior to the 1971 amendments to the occupational dis-
ease statute. The claimant alleged that he contracted progressive intersti-
tial pneumonitis with secondary fibrosis caused by sandblasting. He alleged
a common law negligence action against his employer and, alternatively, a
compensation action against the carrier. In response the carrier confessed
judgment for the maximum amount of workmen's compensation benefits plus
past and future medical expenses. A severance of the compensation action
was ordered and a final judgment was rendered upon the carrier's confession.
The employee then -proceeded with his common law action against his em-
ployer, but the trial court entered judgment for the employer holding that
the rendition of judgment against the carrier barred a common law action
against the employer.
The Houston (Fourteenth District) court of civil appeals specifically noted
that the compensation carrier was also the employer's general liability in-
surer.2 54 The employee intimated that the carrier had simply chosen the
cheaper of two remedies for disposing of the claim. The court stated, how-
ever, that the employee had presented the carrier with the opportunity since
he had filed alternative pleadings and there did not appear to be anything
illegal or unethical in the carrier's course of action.2 55 The court invoked
the long established rule that having claimed and accepted compensation
benefits an employee is then barred, by his election of remedies, from seeking
any common law remedy for the same disability from his employer. In so
holding, the court noted that such election requires a voluntary and knowl-
edgeable choice of remedies, but held the alternative pleadings by the em-
ployee plus the successful prosecution of his compensation claim to judgment
and the acceptance of the proceeds of the judgment, which became a final
and binding adjudication of the carrier's liability from which no appeal was
taken, demonstrated the voluntary and knowledgeable choice made by the
claimant.
Suits Against Nonsubscribers. Rapidly expanding compensation coverage
and the concomitant escalation in premiums has increased the importance of
this area of compensation law as employers seek relief from rising costs. Al-
251. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7a (Supp. 1974).
252. Id. art. 8307, § 5 (1967).
253. 512 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
254. Id. at 828.
255. Id. at 829.
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though there were only two reported cases during the survey year involving
nonsubscribers, the supreme court opinion in Martinez v. Delta Brands,
Inc.25 6 is instructive regarding the employer's duty to furnish safe equipment.
Although all defenses are removed from the employer in such suits, it is still
necessary for recovery that the employee prove negligence on the part of the
employer. 257 -In Martinez the employee alleged, among other things, that his
employer furnished inadequate equipment with which to work and the failure
of such equipment resulted in his injuries. The jury found such allegations
to be true and the employer's failure to be negligence and a proximate cause
of the injuries. The Dallas court of civil appeals, however, reversed the trial
court judgment, holding there was no evidence to support the jury's find-
ings. 258 The supreme court, however, reversed -the judgment of the court of
civil appeals, remanding the case to that court to pass upon the factual insuffi-
ciency points of error. In holding that the employer has a duty to furnish
safe equipment to enable an employee to perform his work, the court relied
upon two pre-Workmen's Compensation Act cases. 259 The leading case, ac-
cording to the court, is Currie v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad,260 but
the court also relied upon Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad v. Hannig.26 1
Regarding the employer's duty, the court quoted from Currie as follows:
The duty of the master is at all times to exercise ordinary care to fur-
nish for the use of the servant safe and suitable machinery and appli-
ances with which the servant is to do his work. Whether or not this
duty has been performed must be determined by considering that which
has been furnished in connection with the uses to which the servant at
the time in question is expected to put it. A piece of machinery wholly
suitable and adequate to the purposes for which it is used at one time
may be inadequate for other uses at different times; and, when the latter
condition exists, the machinery may well be said to be improperly con-
structed, defective, or dangerous. 26 2
The court in Martinez reviewed the sufficiency of the employee's testi-
mony. He testified that he was ordered to weld two large pieces of metal
and used a fork lift and clamps to hold the pieces together. He also testified,
however, that the clamps he had to use were too small and inadequate for
the job. When the chain on the fork lift jumped out of place, the clamps
broke, resulting in the employee's injuries. This evidence, according to the
court, was at least sufficient to raise a fact issue regarding the employer's
negligence.263
In Crain v. Thompson 264 the widow and minor children of a deceased em-
ployee sued the employer for breach of the employment contract for failure
to maintain in full force a policy of workmen's compensation insurance. A
256. 515 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1974).
257. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 1, 4 (1967).
258. 512 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dailas), rev'd, 515 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1974).
259. 515 S.W.2d at 265.
260. 101 Tex. 478, 108 S.W. 1167 (1908).
261. 91 Tex. 347, 43 S.W. 508 (1897).
262. 515 S.W.2d at 265.
263. Id. at 265-66.
264. 510 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
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summary judgment was rendered for the employer on the ground that the
claimants failed to file a claim within six months as required by section 4a
of the Compensation Act. 265 The Dallas court of civil appeals reversed and
remanded the case for trial, holding that, since there was no workmen's com-
pensation insurance and no claim against an insurance company, there was
no basis for applying the procedural limitations of the Act. The claimants
alleged a cause of action based on breach of contract since part of the con-
sideration for the employee's employment was the employer's agreement, im-
plied at least, to continually furnish protection provided by a compensation
policy. The measure of damages, therefore, would be the benefits which
would have been collectible under a policy of workmen's compensation in-
surance had it been in force and effect at the time of the employee's death.
Support for this theory of recovery was found by the Dallas court of civil
appeals in the supreme court opinion in Anderson-Berney Realty Co. v.
Soria.266
Suicide. The phrase "injury sustained in the course of employment" does
not include an injury caused by the employee's willful and intentional attempt
to injure himself. 26 7 Accordingly, suicide would normally be excluded from
coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In 1943, however, the
supreme court approved an exception to the general rule in the case of Jones
v. Traders & General Insurance Co. 268 ,In Jones the court held that a suicide
death is compensable only if the suicide results from the original injury and
only if there is a causal connection established between the original injury
and the ultimate suicide death. Suicide, according to the court, was an inde-
pendent agency breaking the causal connection between the injury and the
death if the mental condition of the victim, though disordered, was such that
the suicide was the result of a voluntary and willful choice. The exception
announced by the court, was that if the insanity was so violent as to cause
the employee to take his life through uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium
or frenzy, then there was a direct and unbroken connection between the in-
jury and the death. 2 9 In Jones the court held that the evidence did not es-
tablish a derangement or insanity of such violence as to cause the employee
to take his life through an uncontrollable impulse or without conscious voli-
tion, despite the fact that the evidence conclusively demonstrated that the
employee drank the poison for the purpose of taking his life and thus to put
an end to his suffering and that he did so deliberately, voluntarily, and will-
fully.
Until this year the Jones case was the only appellate opinion to consider
the issue of suicide. Recently, in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Saun-
ders,270 the Houston (Fourteenth District) court of civil appeals upheld the
Jones rule in denying compensation benefits to the widow and minor child
265. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967).
266. 510 S.W.2d at 413, citing 123 Tex. 100, 67 $.W.2d 222 (1933).
267. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1967).
268. 140 Tex. 554, 169 S.W.2d 160 (1943).
269. 169 S.W.2d at 162.
270. 516 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
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of an employee who, after being injured on the job, committed suicide. The
employee was injured when he slipped in mud and sustained a serious back
injury. Shortly thereafter, he underwent a lumbar laminectomy. He was
subsequently admitted to the hospital for treatment of thrombophlebitis of
his left leg. His pain became more intense several months later, and he was
taking considerable amounts of medication prescribed by his doctors. He
was again readmitted to the hospital and dismissed, whereupon he sought the
opinion of another doctor who indicated the need for more hospitalization
and possible surgery, following which he took his life through a self-inflicted
shotgun wound. There was testimony that the effect of -the combination of
various medications could easily cause depression and give rise to strong sui-
cidal urges in some susceptible individuals. With reference to whether the
act of suicide was willful or intentional, however, the plaintiffs' expert testified
that he supposed that the employee knew that he was taking his life and that
the act was not unconscious but the result of a loss of judgment, loss of sense
of values, and an intoxicated act in the sense of an irrational impulse not
based upon a realistic evaluation of his situation.
After citing and discussing the Jones case, the court of civil appeals ob-
served that the evidence fully justified the conclusion that the employee's in-
jury and the accompanying medical treatment was a producing cause of the
suicide.271 The court further noted, however, that in accordance with the
rule announced in Jones, it was necessary that there be proof that the em-
ployee took his life through an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium or
frenzy without conscious volition. 272 After viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable ,to the jury's verdict in favor of the widow, however, the court
held that there was no evidence raising the issue of uncontrollable impulse
or delirium or frenzy without conscious volition and, therefore, reversed and
rendered judgment for the carrier.
Texas appears to be in the minority in following the uncontrollable impulse
theory of recovery. 273  The concurring opinion in Saunders274 argues for
a review of the Jones rule in light of the present state of scientific knowledge
concerning medications and their effects upon human behavior. In effect, the
concurring opinion argues for the adoption of a chain of causation theory by
stating that a proximate cause of the employee's death was the chain of
events initiated by the injury suffered in the course or scope of his employ-
ment. This chain of events was supported by the medical evidence that the
employee would not have committed suicide but for the medical treatment
made necessary by the original injury. It will be interesting to see if the
supreme court grants a writ of error in the Saunders case and adopts a theory
of compensability for suicide different from that adopted by it in Jones.
Subrogation. In Weishman v. Herron275 an interesting and important issue
271. Id. at 245.
272. Id.
273. IA A. LARSON, supra note 98, § 36, at 6-91; Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 616 (1971).
274. 516 S.W.2d at 245.
275. 512 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ dism'd by agr.) (with-
drawn from publication at request of court).
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was decided by the Eastland court of civil appeals. The case involved an
on-the-job injury whereby the employee suffered a ruptured disc. The em-
ployee underwent back surgery following which he was paralyzed below the
waist. The employee sued the doctor who performed the operation for mal-
practice and Continental Casualty Company, the workmen's compensation
insurance carrier for the employer, intervened, seeking recovery of a sum in
excess of $24,000 which represented the indemnity and medical benefits paid
to and on behalf of the employee. The employee and the doctor, with the
consent of Continental, settled the malpractice case for the sum of $250,000.
A hearing was held to determine Continental's subrogation rights, and the
trial court entered judgment awarding Continental the sum of money ex-
pended on behalf of the employee subsequent to the operation which resulted
in the paralysis. The employee appealed, contending that the injury caused
by the doctor created no subrogation rights in Continental since such injury
was not caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in a third person
as contemplated by the pre-1973 subrogation statute.276 The Eastland court
of civil appeals disagreed, holding that Continental had the right of subroga-
tion, relying upon three somewhat analogous cases.2 77 The court then turned
to the more difficult question of what portion of the compensation and medi-
cal benefits were paid by reason of the original injury and what portion by
reason of the additional incapacity suffered as a result of the malpractice.
In an earlier case, Pedigo & Pedigo v. Croom,278 the same court, in dictum,
suggested submitting a special issue requesting the jury to determine the
amount of additional compensation paid to the employee on account of the
malpractice. The court in Weishman noted that Pedigo suggested a finding
as to the additional amount of compensation paid as opposed to a finding
of the percentage of the injury caused by the malpractice. The findings of
the trial court in Weishman were to the effect that the malpractice of the
doctor was the sole cause of Weishman's disability after the date of his sur-
gery. The Eastland court of civil appeals found that the evidence supported
this finding and, ,therefore, affirmed the judgment of 'the trial court.
II. PROCEDURAL LAW
Special Issues-Rule 277. The supreme court, first by decisions, 279 and sub-
sequently by rule amendments, 2 0 sought to simplify special issue submission
in order to inform rather than confuse the jury. While most of the rule
changes were designed to facilitate the submission of comparative negligence
issues and to obtain the forced percentage and comparison required to im-
plement the comparative negligence statute, at least one rule change affects
276. Ch. 103, pt. II, § 6a, [1917] Tex. Laws 285, as amended, TEX. REv. Cv. SrAT.
ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Supp. 1974).
277. Martin v. Consolidated Cas. Ins. Co., 138 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1943); Hoffman
v. Houston Clinic, 41 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, writ dism'd);
Pedigo & Pedigo v. Croom, 37 S.W.2d 1074 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ ref'd).
278. 37 S.W.2d 1074 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ ref'd).
279. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1973); Adam
Dante Corp. v. Sharp, 483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1972); Yarborough v, Berner, 467 S.W.2d
188 (Tex. 1971).
280. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277.
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the submission of issues in compensation cases. One portion of rule 277 pro-
vides that "[i]nferential rebuttal issues shall not be submitted."'281 The rule
is, however, silent concerning inferential rebuttal instructions to replace the
now deleted issues.
Inferential rebuttal theories are critical to the defense of compensation
cases involving defenses such as prior and subsequent non-compensable in-
juries and diseases, and now, because of the Second Injury Fund amendment,
prior and subsequent compensation injuries as well, 282 confinement of inca-
pacity to a hernia, limitation of specific injuries alleged to extend to and
affect greater members and/or the body generally, as well as various other
defensive theories. The question, in light of the amended rule, revolves
around how the defendant presents its defensive inferential rebuttal theories.
Soon after amended rule 277 was published, Judge James Meyers of
Travis County suggested that the change in the rule may be construed to rule
out completely submission of inferential rebuttal theories by issue or instruc-
tion.283 Judge Meyers reasoned that since the supreme court ruled, in 1971,
that some inferential rebuttal theories should be submitted by instructions
rather than issues, 284 to give substance to the rule change, the rule should
be construed as taking the next logical step, i.e., abandoning inferential rebut-
tal submission altogether, both issues and instructions. It is submitted, how-
ever, that this is an overzealous attempt to simplify issue submission. There
are many so-called "argumentative denials" which have been held to require
independent submission, both in the compensation and personal injury field
as well as other areas. 285 The supreme court, shortly after amended rule
277 became effective, indicated, in dicta, in Union Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Myers,286 a life insurance case, that instructions should be used for
inferential rebuttal issues under the amended rule just as was held in Yar-
borough v. Berner.287 Additional support for this view is also found in a
workmen's compensation case decided during the survey year. In Gulf In-
surance Co. v. Hodges288 the employee sought total and permanent disability
due to a general injury resulting from a twenty-five foot fall to a concrete
floor. The carrier sought to limit disability to the right hand or right arm.
The evidence presented the issue of an incapacitating general injury as well
as incapacitating injuries to the right hand and right arm. The trial court
submitted the case first as a general injury. Issues were then presented re-
questing the jury to find whether the employee's incapacity was caused solely
by the loss of use of the right hand with additional issues inquiring as to the
extent of the loss of use conditioned on an affirmative finding to the loss of
use issue. The jury answered that the incapacity was not solely caused by
281. Id.
282. See text accompanying notes 85-90 supra.
283. Meyers, The Door Is Open-Revised Rule 277, 7 TRIAL LAW. F., July-Sept.
1973, at 3.
284. See Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1971).
285. G. HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS 40-70 (1959).
286. 502 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1973).
287. 467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1971).
288. 513 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ).
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the loss of use of the right hand and the trial court entered judgment on a
general injury for temporary total and permanent partial incapacity. The
carrier appealed, in part, on the question of the trial court's refusal to submit
its requested special issues.
The carrier in Hodges requested the trial court to submit two special issues.
One issue inquired whether the employee's incapacity was not caused solely
by his use or attempted use of his right hand. The second issue inquired
if the employee's incapacity following the injury either had been or would
be limited to the loss of use of the right hand. The Amarillo court of civil
appeals noted that the carrier has the burden to request instructions or issues
which would limit the claimant's recovery to a specific injury2 9 but that the
carrier's requested issues were inferential rebuttal issues condemned by
amended rule 277. Since the case was tried after the effective date of the
rule (September 1, 1973), the court held that the trial court did not err by
refusing to submit the requested issues. The court then stated: "Therefore,
Rule 277, T.R.C.P., requires that the subject matters of Gulf's [carrier] re-
quested inferential rebuttal issues be submitted as explanatory instructions and
not as issues. But Gulf, not having tendered an instruction thereon in sub-
stantially correct wording, waived any error in the omission of such explana-
tory instructions from the charge. '290
Webb v. Western Casualty & Surety Co. 291 is a significant case dealing with
the importance of inferential rebuttal issues. There the claim was for a heart
attack and the carrier alleged that the attack was caused solely by pre-exist-
ing heart disease. The trial court refused the carrier's requested special is-
sue inquiring whether the employee's heart attack was caused solely by his
pre-existing heart disease. The Amarillo court of civil appeals noted that
the carrier, as required, had pleaded the sole cause defense and further noted
that the evidence raised the issue of sole cause.2 92  Accordingly, it was the
employee's burden to prove that the pre-existing disease was not the sole
cause of the employee's heart attack. The employee, however, contended
that Yarborough v. Berner293 and amended rule 277 abolished the inferential
rebuttal practice. The Amarillo court of civil appeals, however, distin-
guished Yarborough, holding that the supreme court's opinion did not extend
to the exclusion of sole cause issues in compensation cases.294  It was also
noted that the Webb case was tried in April 1973, several months prior to
289. Id. at 270, citing McCartney v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 362 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.
1962).
290. 513 S.W.2d at 271. It is interesting to note that the court also held that the
carrier waived its factual insufficiency points of error directed to the jury's answer to
the total and partial incapacity issues. Id. at 271. Since the carrier only complained
of the factual insufficiency of the evidence to support the submission of the special is-
sues, the court was required to convert all points of error into "no evidence" points. Id.
at 272, citing Carza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. 1965). For instructive commen-
tary regarding presentation of points of error on appeal, see O'Connor, Evidence Points
on Appeal, 37 TEx. B.J. 839 (1974); O'Connor, Appealing Jury Findings, 12 Hous. L.
REv. 65 (1974).
291. 517 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1975).
292. Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Webb, 512 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1974), rev'd, 517 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1975).
291. See notes 279-84 supra and accompanying text.
294. 512 S.W.2d at 67.
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the effective date of amended rule 277. Accordingly, the Amarillo court of
civil appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to submit the sole cause
issue on pre-existing condition and reversed and remanded the case for new
trial. In a per curiam opinion,2 95 however, the supreme court reversed the
judgment of the Amarillo court of civil appeals and affirmed the decision of
the trial court by holding the court of civil appeals' opinion to be in conflict
with prior holdings requiring the evidence to raise the sole cause issue and
requiring evidence of causation in terms of reasonable probability rather than
mere possibility.
It should be noted that any instructions or definitions which are designed
to replace inferential rebuttal issues must take into account the prior case law
interpreting the burden of proof on such issues and any instructions and/or
definitions must properly place the burden, of proof. In This regard, however,
the supreme court's amendment to rule 277 allows not only a separate in-
struction to place burden of proof, but specifically allows the court to submit
such explanatory instructions and definitions as may be necessary to enable
the jury to properly pass upon and render a verdict on the issues submitted.
While it is not impossible to prepare a charge in a case where the employee
contends he sustained a general injury and the carrier contends he sustained
a specific injury, it is, to say the least, difficult to utilize a minimum of issues
and a maximum of instructions and definitions without seeking to submit at
least one inferential rebuttal issue. Such a charge will need a great deal of
refinement as well as a great deal of thought.
Trial Procedure. A classic illustration of the difficulty faced by a compensa-
tion carrier in attempting to defend compensation cases is Twin City Fire
Insurance Co. v. King.290 A substantial portion of the court's opinion deals
with the obviously unfair, improper, and prejudicial efforts of the employee's
attorney to sway the jury with bias, prejudice, and sympathy. The Houston
(First District) court of civil appeals recognized that such efforts were cal-
culated to influence the jury to render a verdict based upon improper mo-
tives, and noted that such efforts should have been firmly dealt with by the
trial judge.29 7  The court held, however, that neither the individual com-
ments nor the cumulative effect of the comments caused the rendition of an
improper judgment. In so holding, the court specifically noted that the case
presented an extremely difficult decision in light of the prejudicial conduct
of the employee's counsel, 298 illustrating, once again, the difficulty involved
in attempting to reverse a jury verdict based primarily on trial conduct and
jury argument points of error.
Pleadings. An Eastland court of civil appeals case illustrates the absolute
necessity to plead prior payments of compensation in order for the carrier
to receive credit for the payments. In Butts v. National Standard Insurance
Co. 299 the employee recovered judgment slightly in excess of $4,500, but the
295. 517 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1975).
296. 510 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
297. Id. at 375.
298. Id. at 374.
299. 499 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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trial court credited the carrier with its prior payments of compensation
thereby reducing the jury's award to the employee. The employee appealed,
contending that the trial court erred in allowing a set off for prior payments
of compensation since the carrier had not affirmatively pleaded payment of
the weekly benefits. The carrier had attempted to prove the amount of pay-
ments through its claim representative, but the employee objected to the testi-
mony on the ground of no pleading to support the testimony. The court of
civil appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment
for the employee for the full amount of the jury's verdict, holding, as has
been well established in the past, that in order to obtain credit for prior pay-
ments, a carrier must plead such payments as an affirmative defense.
Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Taylor30 illustrates the necessity for re-
viewing pleadings prior to trial. In that case, the carrier attempted to as-
sert, on appeal, the position that the injury to the employee was a specific in-
jury to her toe or foot. In summarily overruling this argument, the Tyler
court of civil appeals noted that the carrier did not plead any confinement
of the injury nor did it ask for any trial amendment.A0'
Interpleader. A very interesting and instructive case regarding the inter-
pleader procedure often used in death cases is Gonzales v. Texas Employers'
Insurance Ass'n.30 2 The appeal was a sequel to the Dallas court of civil ap-
peals' decision in Gonzales v. Gonzales,30 3 wherein the claimants in a suit
for death benefits under the Compensation Aot were the mother of the de-
ceased employee, his alleged common-law wife, and his daughter by the al-
leged common-law wife. In the first suit the carrier filed a counterclaim and
interpleader against all of the claimants, alleging -that it was willing to pay
full death benefits but could not determine to which of the conflicting claim-
ants benefits should be paid without subjecting itself to multiple recoveries.
In its interpleader, the carrier alleged that the full amount payable was
tendered into court, but the carrier did not actually pay the money to the
cletk. The trial court granted a summary judgment on behalf of the de-
ceased employee's mother and rendered judgment in her favor for the full
amount of the benefits on the ground that no common-law marriage existed.
The common-law wife and daughter appealed, but filed no supersedeas -bond.
Several weeks after entry of judgment, the carrier paid -the full death benefits
to the employee's mother and obtained a release from her. The summary
judgment on 'behalf of the employee's mother, however, was reversed on
appeal and the case remanded for trial.
After the reversal and remand for trial, the employee's mother, who had
already received the full death benefits, nonsuited her claim. The alleged
common-law wife also nonsuited her individual claim but continued to prose-
cute the suit as the next friend of her daughter. The carrier filed a motion
for summary judgment, pleading payment of the benefits under the former
300. 505 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
301. Id. at 940.
302. 509 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also note
185 supra and accompanying text.
303. 466 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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judgment and alleging that it was discharged, as a matter of law, from further
liability. The trial court granted the motion rendering judgment for the car-
rier. On appeal, the carrier contended that it was a mere stakeholder and
had no right to appeal or supersede the first judgment but that the common-
law wife and daughter did have such rights and could have protected the
funds by filing a supersedeas bond. The court of civil appeals rejected this
argument, noting that it would have been persuasive had the carrier actually
paid the funds into the court and the court clerk had paid the funds to the
common-law wife under the court's order.30 4 The crucial question, however,
was whether payment to a party under a judgment pending appeal was
equivalent to payment into the court registry. The court of civil appeals held
that payment to one party under a judgment does not discharge liability to
a different party when the different party is appealing the very judgment
which is paid. The court noted that a judgment is not final so long as an
appeal is pending, even if the judgment has not been superseded.305 Since
that judgment was reversed, no right could have been asserted based on that
judgment. According -to the court, had the carrier paid the funds into the
registry of the court, it would have been fully protected regardless of the dis-
position made of the funds by the trial court pending any appeal, since no
additional liability could have been imposed on the carrier once it had placed
the funds in the custody of the court. Accordingly, the court held that
the carrier had not discharged its liability by paying the funds to a party pursu-
ant to a judgment which had been reversed.
Federal Court-Diversity Jurisdiction. In Hernandez v. Travelers Insurance
Co. 3 0 6 the question facing the United States Court of Appeals for the 'Fifth
Circuit was whether, in a direct action by an employee against the employer's
workmen's compensation insurer, the insurer was to be deemed a citizen of
the state of which the employer was a citizen for purposes of determining
whether diversity of citizenship jurisdiction existed. The employee was a
citizen of Texas, as was the employer. The carrier was incorporated in
Connecticut where its principal place of business was located. The court's
decision concerned the 1964 amendment to the diversity of citizenship juris-
dictional statute.30 7 The amended statute provides that in a direct action
against the insurer issuing a policy or contract of liability insurance, to which
action the insured is not joined as a party defendant, the insurer is deemed
a citizen of the state of which the insured is a citizen as well as any state
in which the insurer had been incorporated or of the state where its principal
place of business is located. The court noted that there were no circuit court
decisions determining whether the term "liability insurance" as used in the
statute included workmen's compensation insurance.308 The court did dis-
cuss two district court opinions309 which had held that compensation insur-
304. 509 S.W.2d at 425.
305. Id. at 426.
306. 489 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1974).
307. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1971).
308. 489 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1974).
309. Id. at 722-23.
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ance came within the meaning of "liability insurance" as used in the statute.
Accordingly, the court held that the carrier was deemed to be a citizen of
the state of which the employer was a citizen and there being no diversity
of citizenship, the complaint was dismissed.
Damages for Frivolous Appeal. 'Recently, employees have sought damages
for appeals by carriers allegedly made without sufficient cause and for delay
only, pursuant to the provisions of rules 435 and 438.310 In the recent case
of Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Dempsey311 -the Houston (First Dis-
trict) court of civil appeals decided that the employee's request for the assess-
ment of ten percent damages on the amount in dispute was excessive and in-
stead imposed damages for delay equivalent to five percent of the trial court's
judgment.
Sufficiency of Evidence on Appeal. Cases during the survey period involving
sufficiency of the evidence produced no surprises.3 12  Typically, most cases
were appealed by the insurance carriers from jury verdicts of substantial
value in favor of the employees. Several cases, however, did involve appeals
by the employees contending that the jury's award of minimum compensation
was against the weight of the evidence. All of the cases again demonstrated
the correctness of the cogent observation of the Beaumont court of civil ap-
peals that it is impossible to reconcile all of the decisions of the courts of
civil appeals' rulings on sufficiency and great weight questions following total
and permanent disability findings.3 13  In view of the increasing technicality
with which the courts are reviewing evidence points on appeal, 314 however,
it behooves any attorney considering an appeal to prepare carefully his or
her evidence points of error.3 15
310. TEX. R. Civ. P. 435, 438; see Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. White, 497 S.W.2d
311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, no writ); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Adams, 488
S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
311. 508 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
312. E.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Haddock, 511 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming total and permanent verdict); Garza v.
Commercial Ins. Co., 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ) (af-
firming a verdict of temporary total disability for one week); Sentry Ins. Co. v. Winn,
506 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ) (affirming a total and perma-
nent verdict); Select Ins. Co. v. Patton, 506 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming a total and permanent verdict); Escamilla v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 499 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ) (affirming
jury finding that employee did not sustain total and permanent loss of use of left foot).
313. Transport Ins. Co. v. Kennon, 485 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
314. See, e.g., J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Razey, 426 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1968); Garza v.
Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. 1965); Hardy v. C.P.I. Sales, 511 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1974, no writ); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Garza, 390 S.W.2d
90 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
315. O'Connor, Evidence Points on Appeal, 37 TEx. B.J. 839 (1974).
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